D511
.J9

511
J9
ppy 1

Who Is Guilty?

AUTHENTICAL REVELATIONS

from

The Belgian Archives

regarding

OUTBREAK OF THE WORLD WAR IN THE LIGHT OF PRESENT TIMES AND LEAGUE OF NATIONS

PRICE 50 CENTS

An eye-opener for many fairminded Americans

NEW YORK, 1920

This booklet can be bought at reduced prices of 3 copies for One Dollar. Send it to your friends, distribute it to your acquaintances and help spread the truth.

Who Is Guilty?

AUTHENTICAL REVELATIONS

from

The Belgian Archives

regarding

OUTBREAK OF THE WORLD WAR IN THE LIGHT OF PRESENT TIMES AND LEAGUE OF NATIONS

PRICE 50 CENTS

An eye-opener for many fairminded Americans

NEW YORK, 1920

JI511
.J9

AUG 20 1
By Irwin

Important—Read This

FOREWORD

The object of the presentation of a series of abstracts from official letters in regard to the activities of England, France and Russia which eventually culminated in the World's War, is the desire of correcting the horrible misrepresentations, controversies and falsehoods which alone were permitted circulation in our own and other countries and to inform the real, true and intelligently thinking men and women of the indecent methods by which they have been hoodwinked from the beginning to the end of that war. Nor is that the only object, for it must be drawn into consideration that by these same methods nearly twenty-six millions of loyal citizens have been made to suffer in mind and body, not considering the shameful robbery under the plausible title of confiscation of over six and one-half billions of dollars of property. These crimes, which have been perpetrated upon these citizens, who are either German-born or of German parentage, and who have been the chief factors in the building of these United States are really too appalling, and the fiendish methods introducing the character of themselves and the endeavor to besmirch even their unborn descendants is too heinous to be true.

It must be admitted that only by such methods was it possible to accomplish the participation in the European war. Only by the shouting of liberty and Democracy was it possible to induce thousands upon thousands, nay, millions of Americans, to lend themselves in carrying out the sinister plot of crushing Germany, the birthplace of millions of the best citizens these United States ever had or ever will have. All the malignant persecutions to which these have been subjected have been devilishly encompassed by various pretexts and were made possible by the infamous scheme of isolation conceived and fostered by Edward VII of England and Declassé of France. When the machinations and preparations by the "Entente cordiale" were finally completed and Russia had succeeded by the instigation of the murder of the Crown Prince of Austria and wife in forcing Austria to arise with the demand for the punishment of the murderers and compel Germany to demand of Russia an explanation for the massing of her troops on Germany's eastern boundary, the furies of war were turned loose. The very first step in the scheme of isolation put into operation was to deprive Germany of all means of outside communication by cutting the trans-oceanic cables. This was done not so much for the sake of defense as it was to deprive Germany and the German people of the means of preventing the infamous propaganda of besmirching the character of all people of German origin, no matter where on the globe they might be living. The devilish inventions of German barbarism committing the Belgian atrocities, of which up to this day not a *single one* has been found to exist, of which there will never be found any, because none were committed, at least, not by the Germans or Austrians, could be exploited to the fullest extent and without the danger of having these lies for which a sufficiently qualifying adjective cannot be found in American language, exposed and contradicted. No one hearing of the blood-curdling and unspeakable atrocities, and made to believe them, could help to cry out horror stricken: Punish the fiends; crush

them out of existence. So plausibly were these lies fed to the people of this and other countries, that even citizens of this country of German extraction were momentarily stunned into believing them. It was not until the reports of American correspondents, etc., which had made it an object of special investigations of learning the extent of these atrocities, had without hesitation pronounced them falsehoods, that they recovered their nearly lost or destroyed faith in the character of their forbears. Should the fundamental plan of England have turned out as she had intended and conceived it, and Germany simultaneously attacked from all sides, should have been overrun by the Russian and French armies, what indeed, would have become of the German women and children? But then the world's sentiment would have been a different one, and England would have found herself exposed in all of her iniquity in having drawn the other nations into a conflict for no other reasons than her envy and jealousy of her competitor in the worlds markets. As, however, events did not shape themselves from the start in such directions she must, of necessity resort to about the vilest means which human minds inflamed with jealousy, envy and hatred, could possibly conceive. She, therefore, started at once upon this slanderous propaganda and thus succeeded in producing a sentiment of hatred which quickly extended to people of German ancestry in this country. Then, now and for all future to come, it must have been and should forever be incredible that an American newspaper, the New York *Sun*, could have published the statement that "the Germans are not human beings in the common acceptation of the term."

There will be very little doubt in the minds of honorable and just citizens of these United States to measure the writer, and through him, the paper as well, according to their true standards. Since this statement reflected upon the character of twenty-six per cent of the white population of the whole country, it certainly was up to the administration, with a Woodrow Wilson at the head, not only to punish the infamous writer but also to stop the avalanche of reports of the Belgian atrocities which were poured into the State Department at Washington by the British Government.

From the book of Frederick Franklin Schrader, formerly Secretary Republican Congressional Committee, and author of Republican Campaign Textbook, 1898, is taken the following quotation from Shrader's book, "1683-1920," being extracts from an address before the Commercial Club of St. Louis, early in 1918, by Melville E. Stone. The address was reported in the St. Louis *Globe-Democrat* of March 25, 1918. Melville E. Stone, General Manager of the Associated Press, among other things made the following statements: "One of the many rumors which I have investigated since the beginning of the war is that 'the hands of the Belgian children have been cut off'. This is not the truth, aside from all other proof, a child whose hands had been cut off would have died if not given immediate attention; any surgeon or physician will bear me out in this. I have investigated forty or fifty such stories, and in every case have found them untrue."

B. N. Langdon, an English man, speaking at Madison, Wisconsin, as reported under date of December 5, 1919, said among other things: "That the public had been fed on a great deal of misinformation, and that most of the German atrocities were manufactured by Allied press agents for the purpose of stitrring up hate."

In this foreword it would be too tedious to present all the authoritative evidence and proofs of the manufacture of these lies and it is up to every fair-minded American to obtain the long list from Schraders "1863-1920."

Enough has been said of this phase of the Anti-German propaganda, and attention can now be given to the second one: "That Germany, successful in defeating her European enemies, would next turn her arms to an attack upon the United States. An unreasoning and inflamed populace lent again a believing ear to this unutterably stupid and brainless story, which is disproven by the fact up to this day even Germany never accepted the declaration of war by the United States of America. She merely fought the American troops as a contingent of the entente cordiale."

The third invention in line of the propaganda which, as every man, woman and child of the present time knows, and which beyond all measure of doubt will be execrated by all future generations, had its origin not in England, was the cry for liberty for all peoples of the globe oppressed by despotic monarchism and militarism. This child of a deceased brain was to the already inflamed people of this country the main lever by which the administration succeeded in mobilizing the whole nation into the fanatic war attitude of the period beginning on April 6, 1917.

The history of the World's War as it will surely be written by honest and conscientious historians and true patriots of this and other countries, will truly be a revelation as well as the blackest blotch of iniquity for all time to come.

As a tithe of contribution to the endeavors of re-establishing not only the character of an entire nation but also that of more than one-fourth of the population of our country, the following abstracts are offered in explanation of the situations as they have been created, which preceded the outbreak of the war.

The letters themselves are the official reports of the Belgian ambassadors and other representatives of that Kingdom in Berlin, London and Paris, and were recovered by the Germans from the Belgian archives. These letters reveal step by step the Isolation Scheme, the forging of the "Entente Cordiale," and above all the endeavor of the Belgian statesmen to keep their own country from becoming enmeshed in the English-French-Russian intrigues.

The letters are absolutely authentic and even the Allies themselves have made little or no attempt to discredit or deny them, but preferred to put these unwelcome and dangerous revelations into oblivion by studied inattention and silence. They are now presented in translation in a very much abridged form, and only the most pregnant sentences in the majority of them have been rendered verbatim, some few which are deemed too essential in their entirety are reproduced in full.

They are numbered in chronological sequence, and since all of them are addressed to the same high official, the address as well as the conclusions have been omitted and only the signatures of the correspondents are attached to each communication.

May these evidences, the products of thoroughly trained and keenly discerning minds as those of Greindl, Lalaing, Leghait and others, help in the just cause of giving the lie to the traducers of Germany and the German character throughout our own adopted fatherland and the world over.

JUSTITIA PUBLISHING CO.

No. 1

Count Lalaing, Belgian Ambassador in London, to Baron Favereau.

London, Feb. 7, 1905.

The enmity of the English public toward the German people is already fairly old. It is based, so it appears, upon envy and fear. The envy in regard to the economic and commercial policies of Germany; the fear, in the contemplation, that the maritime supremacy, the only one which England could claim for herself, might perhaps be contented one of these days by the German fleet. These representations are also being nourished by the English press, regardless of any international complications, and any side-thrust upon the ambitious Emperor and the secret machinations of his chancellor unfailingly finds the applause of the masses.

At a banquet last week the civil lord of the Admiralty, Mr. A. Lee, praised the recently introduced reforms of the Government, which permitted to strike the first blow before the enemy could be prepared; nay, even before war had been declared. He added that the vigilance of the Admiralty should be chiefly extended upon the North Sea. This language has aroused considerable excitement in Germany. Attempts are being made, therefore, to patch up the rent, and it is asserted here that the speech of Mr. Lee has been misconstrued.

LALAING.

No. 2

Baron Greindl, Belgian Ambassador in Berlin, to Baron Favereau.

Berlin, Feb. 18, 1905.

For this reason I have not yet reported on the interview of the English journalist, Bashford, with the Chancellor, notwithstanding the sensation which it produced when published three months ago. As Count Buelow had informed the English people already that Germany had no aggressive intentions toward England, he said nothing which was not already known to any calm critic.

The real cause of the hatred of the English toward Germany is jealousy, brought about by the extraordinary rapid development of the German Commercial Fleet, the German commerce and the German industry. This hatred will last as long as it will take the English to familiarize themselves with the idea that the world's commerce is not a monopoly which belongs by rights to England alone. Besides, this hatred is carefully nourished by the "Times" and a number of newspapers and magazines which do not shrink from calumnies in order to cater to the taste of their readers. One of the chief reasons for the recently formed understanding between France and England, which, in my opinion, has not found as yet a sufficient explanation, has surely been the desire of obtaining a free hand against Germany.

Whatever may have been the secret motive of the English ministers, they have always been ostensibly correct. It was clear that the re-organization of the English fleet was directed against Germany. Under Secretary of State Von Muehlberg told me the Emperor had

spoken of the strictures of Mr. Lee in very earnest tones to the English Ambassador in Berlin. Mr. Lee has in the meantime publicly corrected the quotation of his address by a improvement of those passages which had been irritating to Germany. It appears, however, that very little credit is accorded here to this dementi.

No. 3

Count Lalaing.

London, April 1, 1905.

As you know, the German Emperor is not popular in England, and especially not since the dispatch of his telegram to President Krueger in January, 1896, and you know of the little sympathy which this people has for Germany. The visit of the Emperor to Tangier has not failed to evoke unfriendly articles by the press, which was happy over the opportunity of pouring out its ill-will toward the regent of a country, which is a commercial competitor of England's, which intends to create a war fleet of the first rank and which, at present, encourages the Moroccans in their mighty resistance against the undertakings of France.

It is feared that Germany will insist upon the maintenance of the open door in Tangier, will stand by for the independence of the Sultanate and so prevent the policy of "friendly absorption" undertaken by France and approved by England.

LALAING.

No. 4

Paris, May 7, 1905.

In this letter, Monsieur Leghait reports the presence of the King of England in Paris at a moment when the tension caused by the events in Tangier still exists, and states that while this visit may have considerable significance the latter should not be exaggerated. He continues, however: The silence, which Germany persistently maintains, notwithstanding Monsieur Delcasse's request of dispelling all misunderstanding by open speech, does not permit to let the prevailing nervousness here subside, and the question is when and how one might escape from the false situation in which one finds oneself. Monsieur Delcasse yesterday received Prince Radolin in audience; he regaled him with all sorts of amiable platitudes, but never once touched upon the Moroccan question, etc., etc.

A. LEGHAIT.

No. 5

Count Lalaing.

London, June 8, 1905.

The news of Delcasse's resignation has been received with regret by the press organs of the British Government. The friendly policy of the former Minister of Foreign Affairs toward England and who had been so strangely supported by the French Ambassador in London had led to an entente whose full value had been proven by recent events, etc., etc.

LALAING.

No. 6

Count Ursel, Belgian Charge d'Affaires in Berlin.

Berlin, Aug. 5, 1905.

The English permit no endangering of their commerce or their sea power. The gigantic advances of Germany signify for England a constant menace, and England hesitates at no measure to restrict this expansion. The recent meeting between the German Emperor and the Czar, the visit of Emperor William to Copenhagen, the presence of German warships in Danish waters, have given to the English press a pretense of indulging in accusations and insults against Germany. Wherever England can create difficulties for Germany she embraces such an opportunity immediately.

URSEL.

No. 7

Count Ursel.

Berlin, Aug. 22, 1905.

Count Ursel refers to the alarm which a few German newspapers had indulged in spreading when it was mooted that an English naval division was to hold its maneuvres in the Baltic, but also notifies Count Favereau that the Government had officially explained the matter and that international courtesy demanded a friendly reception of the English warships.

URSEL.

No. 8

Baron Greindl.

Berlin, Sept. 23, 1905.

For years English newspapers, headed by the "National Review," have maintained a campaign in favor of an English-Russian rapproachment.

Upon conclusion of the English-French Treaty, French diplomacy is industriously engaged in the same direction. Rumors are circulating now that the negotiations were being continued, and there are certain indications on the strength of which, I believe, that special attention should be given to them. As I hear, the contemplation of a Russian loan in England is no longer dismissed off-handedly in the ranks of London's high finance. Up to quite recently the English bankers positively refused to even entertain such a possibility.

Yesterday I asked Baron Von Richthofeu what was to be thought of these rumors. He replied that there was surely nothing special in the high and highest circles in England in favor of a movement of a rapproachment toward Russia. I interrupted Baron Richthofeu and said that it was suspected, indeed, that the King of England entertained such a plan and that he had even spoken with the Emperor about it during their recent meeting. The Secretary of State did not contradict it.

In the further course of the conversation, Baron von Richthofeu then expressed the opinion that, notwithstanding Delcasse's downfall, there existed a strong party in France which intended to continue

the policy of the former Minister of Foreign Affairs. Finally the enmity against Germany did play a heavy role in all those combinations. But the Secretary of State did not believe, however, that the dangers were very great. The foundations for an entente between England and Russia were lacking. It would be contradictory to the agreement which had been concluded on August 12th between England and Japan. Against whom could this agreement after all be directed unless it be against the Czar's empire? The plan of an English Russian entente did not fit into the frame of the German friendly speech which Witte had just then made in Paris. The Russian Prime Minister would return to St. Petersburg and would, undoubtedly, have a word to say there. If there was to be an understanding between England and Russia, Witte certainly would also have gone to London.

From our standpoint it would be desirable if the Secretary of State continued to be right in his surmise. The Triple Alliance led by Germany has presented us with thirty years of peace in Europe. Right now it is weakened by the state of dissolution in which Austria-Hungary finds herself. The new French-English-Russian Triple Entente would be no substitution, to the contrary, it would be a cause of a lasting disquietude. This feeling is here so strongly imprinted that the Emperor believed an attack from France supported by England to be closely imminent as soon as it became known at the beginning of last year that Paris and London were industriously negotiating without the object of these negotiatons being clearly understood.

The really very bad personal relations between the Emperor and King of England are no secret to anybody.

The new distribution of the English naval powers is, undoubtedly, aimed at Germany. Whoever still doubted this would have had his eyes opened by the unwise speech of Lee's, the Civil Lord of the Admiralty.

When the British fleet selected the Baltic Sea as a show place for her maneuvres, the British Government ostenibly only exercised its right. It would have been unwise on the part of Germany to have felt insulted thereby, and indeed, she prepared the most amicable reception conceivable for the English sailors. Notwithstanding all this, the visit of the fleet signified a demonstration: the enormously numeric preponderance of the English naval strength should be held tangibly before the eyes of the German people. The usual telegram of the English admiral to the Emperor was couched in frozen tones, and his Majesty replied in the same manner.

The gigantic efforts of the English press to prevent a peaceable conclusion of the Moroccan affair and the insincere credulity with which it receives all calumnies against the German policies prove how ready public opinion in Great Britain is to embrace every combination inimical to Germany.

However, the main point of dissension between England and Russia has been eliminated; that is, the unwholesome ambition of Russia to extend unceasingly the boundaries of her already far too large empire. The military defeats of Russia and her internal complications will force her for a long time to come, to relinquish the policy of conquest.

Political constellations do not last forever. Perhaps a regrouping of the Great Powers, is already in preparation which may lessen European security, and, thereby turn to our own disadvantage.

GREINDL.

No. 9

Abstract of Baron Greindl's Letter of Sept. 30, 1905.

In this letter Baron Greindl after mentioning in general Russia's inability to participate in any warlike undertaking for at least the next ten years to come, expresses himself to this extent: "The tone in which the press campaign in England is generally pitched makes it recognizable that the approachment to Russia is not desired so much for the purpose of relieving tension but for inimical motives against Germany. Unfortunately the King of England may have this view also."

GREINDL.

No. 10

October 14, 1905.

Baron Greindl.

You will recall, Baron, that von Richthofen had told me on September 23 that he did not believe in any Russian-English entente, because there was no reason for such. Notwithstanding, a possible basis for it is present. England does not interest herself any longer in the fate of Turkey, the maintenance of which had been for so long the great principle of her policy. It might give Russia a free hand in Asia Minor. In her ideas such a combination might have the advantage besides of muddling the relations between Russia and Germany and the isolation of Germany is momentarily the direct aim of the English policy.

GREINDL.

No. 11

Paris, October 24, 1905.

H. Leghait.

Notwithstanding all efforts to maintain her supremacy and to down the development of her great Germanic competitor, England apparently desires, anyhow, to escape a conflict, but will her selfish motives not bring us directly into war? The German complaints are directed against the French Government but in reality are aimed at Great Britain. It must be perfectly clear to France, that if Delcassé's policy is continued, she will one of these days bear the costs of a war, the fruits of which will fall to England.

LEGHAIT.

No. 12

Berlin, October 27, 1905.

Baron Greindl.

The monument of Field Marshall Count Moltke was unveiled yesterday in Berlin. At the gala dinner his Majesty explained that this day demanded two toasts, one to the past and remembrance. Filled with deep appreciation of the Providence which gave a great emperor at a great time his Paladine, his Majesty offered his first and silent

toast to the memory of the greatest field marshal of Emperor William.

His Majesty continued: "The second glass is to the future and the present. You have seen, gentlemen, what the position of Germany is in the world; therefore, keep the powder dry; the sword sharp, the aim recognized, the strength on the alert, and the pessimist banished. I raise my glass to our people in arms. The German Army and its General Staff! Hurrah! Hurrah! Hurrah!"

Notwitstanding all official attempts at denial, it could not be plainer expressed that the Emperor now as ever believes that the English policy in Paris, Tokio, St. Petersburg and Washington, was not for the improvement of relations to European and extra European powers, which, by the way, would be perfectly justifiable—but the isolation of Germany.

Here an unconquerable distrust prevails against England. A great many Germans are convinced that England is seeking allies for an attack upon Germany, or—and it would correspond much more to British tradition—that she is working at bringing about a war on the continent in which she would not participate herself but the fruits of which she would harvest. I am told a great many Englishmen harbor similar anticipations and fear a German attack.

I only ask myself upon what such impressions could be founded in London. Germany is absolutely unable to attack England. She would have to control the sea at least for a few days, in order to land an army on the English coast, and for that Germany has no chance. She might be able to transport her fleet hidden in both exits of the Emperor William's Canal, during a night from sea to sea and to prevent a blockade of German ports. Germany might have in such a manner a chance of attacking an inimical flotilla at a favorable moment, but only with a tired-out crew and used-up machines. Only for such a purpose has the German fleet been built; and she would be unable to engage in naval battle alongside the English coast. The relation of numerical strength is too unequal.

To exploit the possibility of a German attack upon the English colonies is superfluous, because, evidently, it is not to be thought of at all.

Are the people, who in England make so much to do about an utterly impossible German attack, entirely sincere? Are they not merely pretending such grievances perhaps for the purpose of inflaming a war in which the German war fleet would be annihilated, the German commercial fleet and the German maritime commerce would be destroyed? England is safeguarded; Germany, on the other hand, is easily hit. If England one of these days attacks Germany to get rid of a rival, she would thereby merely follow out her ancient methods. She has destroyed in sequence: the Dutch fleet with the connivance of Louis XIV., thereupon the French fleet, the Danish fleet, the latter in the midst of peace and without reason, only because she represented an appreciable power at sea.

Between Germany and England there exists no reasonable foundation for a war. The English hatred against Germany arises solely and alone from the envy which the development of the German Navy, the German commerce and German industry called forth.

GREINDL.

No. 13

Berlin, November 18, 1905.

The "Reichsanzeiger" published yesterday the following abstract from the budget for the coming year, which contains the expenditures for the Navy.

The Government proposes etc., etc. The plan shall go into effect within nine years. In its essentials it was already known before the publication of the details, and has now been received very favorably by the public opinion. This circumstance is the more remarkable as the financial situation of the Empire is not at all satisfactory.

The Navy was formerly very unpopular in Germany. A reversion in its favor began after the Boer War (and the war about Cuba), which German public opinion regarded as robberies; it desired to see the Empire safeguarded against similar attacks. The new organization of the British naval powers, which, undoubtedly, are directed against Germany, have made the necessity of possessing a fleet more apparent not for the purpose of attacking England—a thought which is not entertained here by anybody and which would be impossible, anyhow—but solely and alone for the defense against England.

On the Continent, Germany is only exposed to an attack by France or Russia. In the event of a conflict with those powers, the outcome of the war would be decided by the army, and a naval battle, no matter in whose favor it would terminate, would have no influence upon the peace conditions. Germany, therefore, only has to fear England. England alone necessitates the maintenance of a war fleet which exceeds in size the measure which the protection of her commercial interests in foreign countries demands.

Unfortunately, not only is the attitude of the English press but also that of the English ministers, adapted to nourish this distrust.

Notwitstanding the official denials, nobody doubts here that the aggressive policy of Mr. Delcassé has been instigated by England.

I am asking myself where and when has Germany crossed the English politics? Is it the recollection of the telegram which Emperor William dispatched to President Krueger after the capture of Jameson and his colleagues? That seems too long ago. Besides, one should not forget in London that at that time it concerned a band of free booters, which while organized under the hand of the English Government, was, nevertheless, officially disavowed by England.

GREINDL.

No. 14

Berlin, December 31, 1905.

Baron von Richthofen spoke to me yesterday with satisfaction of the ministerial change in London. The Secretary of State does not believe that a pre-conceived plan to break with Germany existed in London. He thought, however, that the French had recently shown a nervousness which was not justified by anything. One seemed to imagine in Paris that Germany was merely waiting for an opportunity to fall upon France. Germany would only make war if she was forced to it, she had never, even in the remotest, thought of provoking

a war. What would Germany gain by it? The whole of German policy proved Germany's peaceful intentions. She had not made the least effort of gaining by the internal unrest in Russia. I asked the Secretary whether I should regard as authentic the conversation between the Emperor and a Frenchman reported three days ago in the "Temps"? In the main the Emperor is accredited of having stated that he was wrongly believed of being surrounded by a war party; even if such existed it would still be of no importance as the decision between war and peace was resting with him. The Emperor did not want any war, as it would be in direct opposition to his duties toward God and his people. Baron von Richthofen replied that the statement in the "Temps" had been correct, if not in form, but in text. He added that the Emperor had made such remarks to the French military attache in Berlin, the Marquis de Laguiche. Otherwise these were the well-known thoughts of his Majesty.

I replied that it appeared to me that it was possible to characterize the policy of the Emperor in the following words: The highest ambition of his Majesty is the maintenance of peace during the duration of his reign. The Secretary of State replied that that, indeed, was the chief motif of the Emperor's policy.

GREINDL.

No. 15

London, January 14, 1906.

Letter of Mr. E. Von Grootvan, Belgian Chargé d'Affairs in London.

In it he refers to the impending conference in Algeciras and speculates as to the intentions of the powers most concerned, Germany and France. He states that England was on the side of France and that she had entered into obligations with France which she would have to fulfill, even in the case of a German-French war and all other dangers.

VON GROOTVEN.

No. 16

Paris, March 6, 1906.

H. Leghait.

King Edward the VII. arrived in Paris Saturday evening and stopped at the English Embassy. Although his Majesty desired to preserve his incognito, the circumstances of his presence in Paris and the meetings which he had are of special significance. The King exchanged calls with the President of the Republic and invited him to dinner on Sunday at the Embassy. Furthermore, he had at luncheon yesterday Messrs. Loubat and Delcassé. This attention to Mons. Delcassé just at this present moment is much discussed. One sees in it, in general, a significant notice, which has, on account of its possibly far-reaching and extremely weighty consequences, produced uneasiness.

Naturally the King of England desired to give to that minister, who made the English opinions with so much zeal his own, a special sign of appreciation of his sympathy; but on account of the fact that

he called to himself the very man whose retirement Germany had demanded, he has added to the agreement of April 8, 1904, a new significance and has solemnly approved of a policy against which Germany protested and which even France herself had refused to entertain. If there could have existed any doubts still about Great Britain's intentions, they are now dispelled.

The King has wanted to show, so it seems, that the policy which the energetic intervention of Germany had called forth has, notwithstanding remained the same because England adheres firmly and unshaken to the principles of the agreement of April 8, 1904. This demonstration is considered in diplomatic circles as unnecessary, and at this moment as extremely dangerous, for one believes himself drawn against his will, into English politics, the consequences of which one fears, and which, generally, had been disapproved after the exposé of Delcassé. The long and short of it is, that one sees in it with apprehension an indication of the efforts of England to poison the situation to such an extent that war becomes inevitable.

LEGHAIT.

No. 17

Berlin, April 5, 1906.

Baron Greindl.

The movement in favor of an approachment toward Germany called forth by Lord Avebury has remained without results. The English press has done its utmost in preventing satisfactory conclusions of the conference at Algeciras. It has shown itself less amenable than the French newspapers and has never ceased one moment to disseminate German plans of aggression which have never existed. Apparently the English ambassador in Algeciras made no efforts whatever to find a solution equally satisfactory to France and Germany.

There is no more doubt that it was the King of England who independently of his government has driven Delcassé into a warlike policy and has given him the anyhow impossible promise of landing 100,000 English soldiers in Holstein.

The invitation of the King to Monsieur Delcassé during his sojourn in Paris can only be considered as a challenge.

If there could have existed still any doubts whatsoever, the remarkable demarche of Col. Bernardiston (English Col.) by General Ducarne (Belgian Chief of Staff) would have destroyed them.

GREINDL.

No. 18

London, June 23, 1906.

Count Lalaing.

After stating the efforts which a close circle of English people, headed by Lord Avebury, had made with the intention of bringing about a more friendly attitude on the part of the English people toward Germany, Count Lalaing summed up the following conclusions:

The actual results of these efforts are just about naught. The public opinion stands now firm. The English press has carried on such a missuse by its attacks upon the Emperor, his government and

his people, that the public remains distrustful. Germany is the great commercial, military and perhaps, also, future maritime competitor, therefore, every good citizen believes himself obligated to hate that country, because he tells himself that it is at the moment the only country which, since the awakening of Russia and the Entente with France, he has to fear.

LALAING.

No. 19

Berlin, July 16, 1906.

Baron Greindl.

The reason for the strained English-German relations must not be sought in the personal feelings of the rulers but in the attitude of public opinions of the both countries. This public sentiment also guides the policy of the British Government which has remained just as inimical to Germany under the liberal party as under the unionistic one. What could the English possibly have to fear at the hands of Russia in her present state of unrest. It can readily be conceived what Russia could gain by England's friendship, but it is much less clear how Russian friendship could serve England. What else can London really want excepting to create enemies for Germany? According to the "Morning Post," England and Russia have a plan for an entente for the purpose of sanctioning the building of the railroad in Mesopotamia with the condition that Russia should connect her Caucasus line and that England should have the control of the line from Bagdad to the Gulf of Persia. Such an agreement, should it be effected, would be the climax of all shamelessness. The Sultan is an independent ruler; he gave the concession for a railroad through Mesopotamia to a German bank. No foreign power has the right or could even offer the least pretense of meddling with these exclusively internal affairs of Turkey. Notwitstanding this plan exists and Lord Lansdowne recently declared in the Upper House that he had in 1903 ineffectually endeavored to internationalize the Bagdad Railroad, and from the beginning England has endeavored to place all of obstacles in the way of this undertaking.

When the German bank obtained the concession seven years ago, it offered France and England participation, not because it needed foreign capital for the undertaking—and it is in a position to carry out the project unaided—but to avoid petty international jealousies, etc., etc. It is very much to be feared that with or without the periodic reconciliations, toward which we are dulled now, jealousy and mistrust will become the normal condition of the relations between England and Germany.

GREINDL.

No. 20

After mentioning the proposed restrictions for army and navy expenditures, Count Lalaing states that England would want to pose before the second peace conference at the Hague in January, 1907, as favorably inclined to partial disarmament on account of the proposed

curtailment of the navy. He continues: But in order to bring acceptance of this plan, the Minister of the Marine was obliged to make the explanation that in the event of a sanction of his program, the seapower of Great Britain was still far greater than that of the two other greatest navies in the world and that England would anyhow be without a competitor on the seas. England's magnanimous initiative by way of reformation looses considerably in value by the fact that she runs no danger, and that now as ever she intends to rule the ocean.

Should the United States or above all Germany refuse at the Hague Conference to share the English aspect, England will not fail in placing the responsibility for the miscarriage of her humane ideas and those of her new apostle of peace, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman upon the shoulders of those nations.

COUNT LALAING.

No. 21.

Paris, Feb. 4, 1907.

H. Leghait.

In this letter M. Leghait announces the arrival of the King and Queen of England in Paris and states that the voyage had been unexpected and even caused surprise to the French Government. He continues: Since recently there exists here an as yet silent and hesitating, but nevertheless, very significant opposition against the hoodwinking with which one permits oneself to be drawn into the policies of England. The propositions and intentions of this Power do not appear any more as unselfish as they did in the beginning. In consequence, thereof, a party is forming which wants to shake off the yoke of this foreign influence in order to give France a greater and more honorable freedom of commerce, without, of course, relinquishing the otherwise friendly relations. I have grounds for the assumption that the English endeavors in Africa and, especially, in the Congo, has produced this feeling of distrust which shows itself here." Etc., etc.

LEGHAIT.

No. 22.

London, Feb. 8, 1907.

Count Lalaing.

Count Lalaing describes the anger with which the English received the news that all parties in Germany at the last elections, with the exception of the Socialists, had strongly supported the Emperor and his policies. Many of the Socialists even went over to the other parties. Count Lalaing continues: That the Emperor continued to enjoy such a popularity was a revelation to the English which nourished the belief—zealously fed by the press—that the Emperor was little loved, had lost the people's confidence, and, therefore was to be feared very little.

However that may be, public opinion has been badly disappointed by the results of the election, and the fear and the jealousy and the anti-German sentiment has not abated.

LALAING.

No. 23.

Berlin, Feb. 9, 1907.

Baron Greindl's letter is herewith produced in full:

"To my great astonishment I have perceived that earnest foreign newspapers have attributed a warlike significance to the short speech which the Emperor made to a concourse of the people on the night of Feb. 5. I have had the honor of transmitting to you in my report of day before yesterday the text of this address. No man here has thought of interpreting the words of his Majesty in the nature of a menace to the other Powers. One knows too well the usual manner of expression of the Emperor to misunderstand the extent of his speeches. One must also not doubt the peaceful intentions of his Majesty; he has demonstrated it sufficiently during his eighteen years of reign.

It appears to me that one should know elsewhere, upon what one may depend; therefore, I ask myself: Is this exhibition of excitement sincere? Should it not be rather a continuation of this campaign of calumny which has been carried on for years in the press of Paris, London and St. Petersburg and by which the "Temps," the official organ of the French Ministry, has distinguished itself during the last few weeks?

GREINDL.

No. 24.

Paris, Feb. 10, 1907.

A. Leghait.

In this letter M. Leghait discusses the presence of the English King and Queen and the hidden object of their visit. Two pregnant passages are quoted verbatim.

"It is useless to attempt to deny that these tactics which ostensibly have as their object the avoidance of war, are really pursued with the intention of producing in Berlin an uncomfortable feeling and of creating in Germany the desire to do everything to withdraw from the entrapping by the English politics. France, which sincerely desires the maintenance of peace and the improvement of her relations with Germany, will have to make strong diplomatic efforts to prove to Berlin, that the Entente cordiale need not disquiet Germany and had not been consumated to hinder her in her expansion.

One is so keenly sensitive of this precarious condition, and the danger of this by-play, that all official and earnest press organs are silent about this situation of things and none of them will risk the enjoyment of the manifestation of the English friendship."

LEGHAIT.

No. 25.

Monsieur E. de Cartier, the Belgian charge d'affairs in London, writes under date,

London, March 28, 1907.

In his letter he states that since the foreign affairs of Russia have been intrusted to M. Iswolski a noticeable approach between the cabinets of St. James and St. Petersburg had been effected and that

an understanding, impossible two years ago, seemed to be near consumation. He continues as follows:

"The Dogger-bank incident, the English sympathies with Japan at the time of the war of 1904, the bitter competitorship in Persia, all that belongs to the past and if one may trust certain indications it appears to us that the English policy, whose whole strength is directed upon the isolation of Germany, will in the near future offer the spectacle of an English-Russian Entente. Etc., etc.

E. de CARTIER.

No. 26.

Berlin, March 28, 1907.

By the resolutions adopted at the Conference of Algeciras, France, like all other interested powers, promised to respect the independence of the Sultan of Morocco. But this didn't prevent the French Minister of Foreign Affairs to remark to my Paris Colleague that the Sultan was nothing but a puppet who had nothing else to do but to obey the dictates of the diplomatic corps. Just as little does it prevent a government supported French Company from establishing wireless telegraphy, even with disrespect of the sovereign rights of the Sultan and in spite of his protests.

The resolutions further announced equal rights for all, excepting in regards to the Police and Banking Systems. In spite of the explicit wording, M. Pichon construes the text to mean that French supremacy would have to supervene everywhere.

The French arrogance is becoming again just as great as in the worst days of the Second Empire and the entente cordiale is to be blamed for it. It has even risen a degree or two since the negotiations between London and St. Petersburg, of which France, no doubt, has been cognizant, appear to bring about an entente.

I will not say that there exists already between the cabinets the contemplation of an attack upon Germany. Germany can defend herself, but the responsibility for a war, the result of which is more than doubtful should appall the bravest. But one must not forget that all wars of the most recent occurrence have not been made by the governments. They have been forced upon them by popular unrest, and the regrouping of the European Powers has been effected for the purpose of leading public opinion upon dangerous roads. The effects make themselves felt already.

The French press unanimously places the responsibility of Doctor Mauchamp's assassination upon Germany, which it regards as a consequence of frictions instigated in Berlin. Would it not be more logical to attribute the ferment among the natives of Morocco to methods by which France and England agreed to convert Morocco into a French colony.

The English press continues its campaign caluming with greater bitterness than ever. It sees the hand of Germany in every thing that is unpleasant for England. In case of need it manufactures whole stories such as ostensibly the plan of closing the Baltic Sea. All this occurs at a moment when England is creating discord by her endeavors to force the explanation not of her own armament but that of her opponents at the Hague Conference and in this way conjures a reduction of the safety of Europe.

GREINDL.

No. 27.

Berlin, April 8, 1907.

Baron Greindl.

As I already had the honor of reporting to you a few days ago, that the moment I had cognizance of the Algeciras Acts, I had the conviction that France had not relinquished but merely postponed to a more favorable moment, her plan of annexing Morocco. France took over the police and the controlling influence of the bank. Along the extensive common border there are living a number of nonsubjugated tribes which will furnish France with ample pretext for intervention. If needful she can even invent one as she did at the time in Tunis. She also has a ready army in Hegeria and France, therefore has the means at her disposition of materializing her ambitious intentions.

If I had ever carried the illusion that the pledges of Algeciras would be loyally kept, the attitude of the French Government on the question of selection of a director of public works, the occupation of Yd—— and a recent article in the "Temps" would have destroyed the illusion.

We just have to experience again to our cost what the return to the traditions of the second empire or rather to those of the usual French policy, means. Every time that France, in the course of history, has felt herself strong enough she has endeavored to assume the sovereignity of the whole world. Right now the Entente cordiale with England gives her the necessary confidence.

Very likely France has resumed again elsewhere her usual methods of not bothering herself about obligations which are irksome to her and of generally insisting upon her demands.

GREINDL.

No. 28.

London, April 12, 1907.

E. de Cartier.

In this letter de Cartier discusses the visit of the King of England to the Spanish Baths and the possibly hidden political intentions connected with it. The fact that the under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs accompanied their majesties to Cartagena seems to indicate that the visit was not for pleasurable purposes only. He makes the noteworthy remark, that the visit of King Edward with his royal nephew in Cartagena had above all the intention of tightening the relations of Spain with Great Britain and of weakening German influence in Madrid. But there are no plausible grounds for assuming any practical results which may have been obtained at this meeting.

DE CARTIER.

No. 29.

Berlin, April 18, 1907.

Baron Greindl.

In this letter Baron Greindl openly stated that King Edward's visit to the King of Spain is merely a part of his campaign for the

isolation of Germany. He further refers to the contemplated visit of the English King to the King of Italy in Gaeta, and states that it will not afford anything new. The understanding between Italy, England and France is a fact, irrespective of the Triple Alliance, and dates from the moment that Italy began to enter into an agreement with these powers about the extent of interests along the Mediterranean. If this agreement had not existed earlier, the entente cordiale between France and England would have brought it about. How could Italy, in case of a conflict, manage to protect her extensive coast lines against the attacks of the combined French and English fleets? And what could her German and Austro-Hungarian allies do for her protection?

This zeal to unite powers, which no one threatens, ostensibly for the purpose of self defense, may be justly regarded with suspicion. It is impossible for Berlin to forget the offer of 100,000 men which the King of England made to M. Delcassé. We ourselves have to remember the remarkable disclosures which Colonel Barnardiston made to General Ducarne and who knows whether there have not been similar intrigues which have not come to our knowledge.

GREINDL.

No. 30.

London, May 24, 1907.

Count Lalaing.

In this report Count Lalaing refers to the fact that the attitude of the English toward the Germans has not improved and gives for his reasons the activities of certain individuals whose duplicity he at the same time exposes.

"A certain category of the press, here known under the title of 'Yellow Journalism,' is responsible in the greatest measure for the inimical sentiment between the two nations. What can possibly be expected of such a journalist as that man Harmsworth, now Lord Northcliffe, publisher of the 'Daily Mail,' the 'Daily Mirror,' the 'Daily Graphic,' the 'Daily Express,' the 'Evening News' and the 'Weekly Dispatch,' who in an interview for the 'Matin' says: 'Yes, we despise the Germans from the bottom of our hearts. They make themselves hated in all Europe. I shall not permit my newspapers to print the least thing which might injure France, but I do not want her to do anything which may be agreeable to the Germans.'"

But, of course, the same publisher attacked the French with equal venom in 1899, he wanted to boycott the Paris Exposition and wrote: "The French have succeeded in convincing John Bull that they are his bitter enemies, England has wavered for a long time between Germany and France, but she has always respected the German character, while it has come about to feel only contempt for France. A cordial understanding can never exist between England and her next door neighbor. Enough of France which possesses neither courage nor political sense."

This type of journalists, publishers of cheap but widely read papers falsify at their pleasure the opinions of an entire nation.

It is perfectly clear that official England silently pursues a policy inimical to Germany. This policy which aims mainly at the isolation of Germany, has not found disfavor with King Edward who has placed his personal influence to the service of this idea; but it surely is exceedingly dangerous to poison public opinion in such an openly shameless manner in which this irresponsible press which I mentioned above has done it.

LALAING.

No. 31.

Berlin, May 30, 1907.

Baron Greindl.

In this letter Baron Greindl speaks of the reception and entertainments which the visiting English journalists were receiving in Germany and discusses the efforts which were being made by both parties to re-establish better feelings. Baron Greindl, however, is skeptical and says: "The strained relations between the two countries are the more difficult to remove because there are no definite questions of dispute at the bottom of it. If there existed a conflict between Germany and England like the one between London and Paris on account of Egypt, some form of exchange of ideas would make an end of it. But upon the entire globe there is absolutely nothing which could possibly dim the relations between Germany and England. The coolness in the relations does not arise from any concrete facts. It is merely a question of sentiment."

"England looks askance upon the wonderful progress of Germany in the domains of industry, commerce and merchant marine. Habituated to being without a rival, every competition appears to her as an infringement upon her rights. In regards to the development of the German navy, England pretends a solicitude, the sincerity of which, I consider more than doubtful. To the contrary, Germany has everything to fear. For centuries England has made it her business to destroy the naval power of foreign nations, just as soon as they had reached an appreciable significance. France has had to experience this after Holland. Then came the turn of Denmark whose ships were destroyed by Admiral Nelson without the least pretext after he had entered the port of Kopenhagen as a friend."

Far removed from any intention to bring about any tension in her relations to England, Germany suffers through these conditions as is proven by the repeated attempts at an understanding, the initiative of which has always come from Berlin.

The tension between the German-English affairs may possibly be serviceable for some pusillanimus, shortsighted, political speculations, but it endangers the higher interest for the maintenance of European peace, this had been secured to us during thirty-six years by the overbalance of Germany. It encourages in their plans those statesmen who are not content with the status quo.

GREINDL.

No. 32.

Berlin, June 8, 1907.

Baron Greindl.

Baron Greindl discusses the various entertainments which had been prepared for the visiting English journalists by their German colleagues and mentions how the official press had repeatedly expressed the wish that the friendly personal relations which had been established, might result in bettering the relations between the two countries. But at the end of his descriptive report, Baron Greindl summarizes in the following pregnant terms: "What will be the result of all these manifestations? Probably nothing. The report which you forwarded to me day before yesterday, proves to me that my colleague in London, who, by the way, is in a much better position than I, to judge the conditions, is much more skeptical than I. As Count Lalaing very properly says, the King of England pursues personally a policy, the final aim of which is the isolation of Germany. His procedure corresponds with the sentiment of the nation which has been misled by an unscrupulous press, which only has in mind a sale as large as possible, and is, therefore, solely and alone, concerned in baiting the passions of the common people. And it is not only the cheap newspapers which bemean themselves to such measures. The 'Times' has carried on for years a campaign of calumnies and lies. Its correspondent in Berlin, who has every opportunity of informing himself thoroughly, stirs up the hatred of the English against the Germans by attributing to the Imperial Government ambitious intentions —the folly of which is apparent—and accusing it of all sorts of sinister machinations to which it has never given a thought. Nevertheless the people of England believe it without the wink of an eye-lash, because these inventions correspond with their prejudices. How could, then, an anti-German sentiment be converted by an insignificant number of honest and clear-seeing journalists? The English journalists, who have accepted the hospitality, belong, no doubt, in the majority, to this elite. One has already preached to converts."

GREINDL.

No. 33.

Paris, June 17, 1907.

A. Leghait.

Monsieur A. Leghait refers in his letter to the friendly understanding between France, England and Spain. According to M. Pichon's explanations, the understanding is of a purely diplomatic nature, and contains neither a military convention nor secret clauses. The object is purely the maintenance of the status quo in those parts of the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean in which the three powers are interested. He further refers to the ostensibly peaceful character of the agreement but raises the question about the menaces which would justify such large safety measures. He states that there are many discerning people who believe that, instead of securing peace, these preparations will provoke war and contend that if complications should arise in Europe, France will be the first to receive the blow, and also will have to carry the eventual consequences. Mr.

Leghait concludes this letter with the following opinion: "In order to equip herself momentarily against dangers, which probably only exists in her imagination, or possibly only to fortify the position of the leaders in her internal politics. France is saddling herself with a debt of gratitude, which will appear the heavier, if one of these days, England discloses the objects, for which she will utilize the strength which she is marshalling around her today."

LEGHAIT.

No. 34.

London, June 19, 1907.

Count Lalaing.

In very much the same manner, the same opinions and the same skepticism, which M. Leghait's letter expresses, Count of Lalaing refers to the agreement between France, England and Spain. He says, however, "It could scarcely be believed that Germany does not see in this agreement anything else but a continuation of the English policy which aims in every way to isolate the German Empire."

LALAING.

No. 35.

Berlin, June 22, 1907.

Baron Greindl.

With his customary perspicacity Baron Greindl also discusses the French-English and Spanish agreement, and says that international understandings are the style, but he continues: "If the agreements contain no secret clauses, they appear to have been made for no other reason excepting the pleasure of setting Germany aside in the regulation of the world's affairs. These safety measures against imaginary dangers are, however, very apt to create and nourish the idea that Germany were the power bent upon attack, and that the other powers were obliged to consolidate against her undertakings. The damage would not be so great if these contracts were superfluous, but they compromise the cause of peace, which, ostensibly, they are meant to serve, because they arouse the conviction in the minds of all Germany-hating circles, that the moment of the materialization of their plans is drawing near.

GREINDL.

No. 36.

Berlin, July 1, 1907.

Baron Greindl.

Baron Greindl speaks of the new French Ambassador in Berlin, M. Cambon, who expresses himself to the effect that he contemplated bringing about a better understanding between his own country and Germany. "But in his (Baron Greindl's) opinion, the best which could possibly be achieved would be correct relations between Berlin and Paris. A real and lasting approachment would presuppose the exclusion of all ideas of revenge, but even among the most reasonable and peace-loving French, there is not one who in the innermost recesses of his heart does not preserve at least a hope of it."

GREINDL.

No. 37.

London, Aug. 10, 1907.

E. de Cartier.

The English public is following with interest the developments of the Moroccan crisis. The newspapers are publishing long reports, but in general they are fairly moderate in their remarks and contemplations to which the tragic events, at present taking place in Casa Blanca and other places, give rise.

Even though public opinion is all on the side of France, in this matter, it is probably that way because it is not particularly delighted with the idea that this is the first result of that dictum of peaceful penetration advocated but a short time ago by Delcassé, but, probably for the most part, because it is imagined, whether rightly or wrongly, that the military undertakings, whose playgrounds at the time are the Moroccan ports, are disagreeable to Germany.

E. DE CARTIER.

No. 38.

Count Lalaing.

London, October 11, 1907.

Count Lalaing in this report calls the attention of the Minister to the leader in the "Times" referring to the recent visit of the German Emperor to London and the veiled attacks upon the German Chancellor, Prince Buelow. Sir Edward Grey is quoted as having stated that the improvement of the English-German relations were dependent upon the establishment of a good understanding between Germany and France."

LALAING.

No. 39.

Berlin, January 27, 1908.

Baron Greindl.

In this letter Baron Greindl discusses the speech which Monsieur Delcassé made before the Chamber of Deputies. He frankly says that the speech made a painful impression upon him, not because Delcassé, after three years of silence, had praised his own policy, but because of the praise he got for it, and because of the manner in which, especially, the London press had received it. The speech virtually swarms with innuendoes which are injurious to Germany. Delcassé said in his diatribe that the German Government had had absolutely no pretext for intervention in Morocco, and, consequently, it must have had intentions of its own. Europe had just then escaped a sort of Hegemony, and all nations who had the independence of Europe at heart and who desired to strengthen this independence, had rallied around France.

Baron Griendl now takes up his own criticism and writes: "Where has Delcassé ever seen that Germany intended to force her sovereignty upon the other European peoples? We are her next door neighbors, and since twenty years I have been unable to discover in the Imperial Government the slightest tendency of misusing its power

and our weakness. I would only wish that all the other great powers had exercised the same forbearance toward us."

Delcassé says that Germany had never had the intention of making war on account of Morocco. That is very true; but instead of ascribing this moderation to the peaceful intentions of the Emperor, he sees the cause for it in the fact that France had the majority of the powers, the public opinion of the whole world and above all his own self confidence for herself.

In other words Delcassé praises himself for having maintained the world's peace, thanks to his coalition with the King of England in his isolation policy against Germany.

M. Delcassé says one should not displace a foreign policy (that is his own) which had twice already preserved the peace of Europe.

"Under which circumstances then? When has the peace of Europe ever been threatened excepting by the French thoughts of revenge?"

In conclusion I would like to indicate that the praise which the English papers accorded to Delcassé, clearly demonstrates how much is thought of the recent approachment between Germany and England.

"The policy, which King Edward VII pursues under the pretext of saving Europe from a German danger, has conjured an only too real French danger, which in the first place is menacing to us."

GREINDL.

No. 40.

Paris, January 27-30, 1908.

A. Leghait.

Monsieur Leghait writes in his report on the events which have taken place in Morocco and which have made public opinion catch its breath. He further mentions that the most important and entirely unlooked for event of the season had been the appearance of M. Delcassé, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was dismissed under such tragic circumstances in June, 1905. Since then M. Delcassé has refrained from any expressions of self justification with as much tact as patriotism; his silence had been recognized here as well as on the other side of the Eastern frontier. But the question is: Has M. Delcassé just accidentally or premeditatively entered into the debate. He presented the history of the friendships which grouped themselves about France during his administration, and ascribed to himself the merit of having created a new situation, which, in his opinion, makes a war with Germany impossible. The French Chauvinist has made this assertion enthusiastically his own, without asking himself, 1st: "Whether this regrouping of the powers is not the result of a comprehensive program which has been wonderfully formulated in London, and, in the accomplishment of which, M. Delcassé has been far more of a tool rather than the driving power? 2d, Whether his assertion is well founded that the resistance to the German demands in 1905, and the refusal to go to Algeciras would not have brought about a war?" It is very easy today for the ex-Minister to utter, for his own benefit, such a viewpoint in order to inflame the patriotic sentiments of those, who had suffered the humiliation of

1905. But that changes nothing of the fact, that all, who applauded M. Delcassé yesterday, had, at the time of his downfall, a materially different conception of the result of his policy; no one had offered him a helping hand or had risked to utter word of defense, when he was sacrificed. Even if M. Delcassé has succeeded by already striking a patriotic chord, to achieve a decidedly personal benefit, the question is, however, whether he has not committed a grave political error by bringing again into prominence ticklish issues and in risking to produce in the foreign press new and dangerous polemies. One can see already how much his speech has been valued in England and how much it has been criticised in Germany.

LEGHAIT.

No. 41.

Berlin, January 29, 1907.

Baron Greindl.

In addition to my report of day before yesterday, I beg to call your attention to a Berlin telegram in the Cologne Gazette, No. 98, which is, undoubtedly, of official origin.

The Gazette says that the challenging tone of Delcassé has not passed unnoticed by Germany. It congratulates on the temperate tone of the German press the more, as the French press is returning also to a more moderate attitude. The expressions which were uttered against the adventurous policy, defended by Delcassé, became more numerous. One might have hopes that no lasting mischief had resulted.

The official telegram further remarks that the press of those countries which maintained friendly relations with France, had, by no means, been delighted with the ebullitions of Delcassé. They had already been condemned in England by some of the newspapers. The Italian and the Spanish press had been still more severe. In both of these countries the declaration was made that they were unwilling to follow France on a course of adventurous policy, upon which Delcassé endeavored to force her. This had been expressed with such a clearness which may have contributed in producing a cooler conception of the situation.

GREINDL.

No. 42.

Berlin, February 2, 1908.

Baron Greindl.

In this letter, Baron Greindl refers to the draft of a proposed "increase of the Navy, and that it had been accepted in the Reichstag, Bebel alone dissenting. Greindl says that this unanimity confirms the correctness of his own conclusions and showed better than all conventions of princes and political speeches what, in reality, were the relations between Germany and England." No man here has ever harbored the absurd and impossible thought of an attack upon England but the whole world feels apprehensions of an English attack." And here Greindl states is the reason why the Reichstag, without batting an eye, passed the bill for the enormous increase of naval

expenditures, although the Imperial Budget showed a deficit and no one knows how it can be equalized.

GREINDL.

No. 43.

Berlin, March 28, 1908.

Baron Greindl.

The document by Baron Greindl is brief and simply refers again to the acceptance of the increase of the naval budget. The sentiment in its favor had been so great that it passed the three readings in one session in spite of the fact that the national budget showed already a deficit.

GREINDL.

No. 44.

Berlin, May 6, 1908.

Baron Greindl.

The most interesting part in the White Book, which I had the honor to submit to you with my report of yesterday, is the forbearance, with which the German Government apparently tries to overlook the palpable contradiction which arises between the perfectly unobjectionable explanations of the French Government and the conquest of Morocco, to which France is proceeding on the strength of an ostensible European mandate, which nobody had ever given her. France pretends to have been forced to it by the circumstances which she designates as accidental, but which, on the contrary, she herself, has very studiously produced. Immediately after the assassination of her citizens in Casa Blanca, and without having grounds for the assumption that the Moroccan Government would fail to discover and punish the guilty ones, the French Government has proceeded in a manner which is far more despicable than the murders, insofar as, that at the same time, when her delegates, full of virtue, made beautiful and humanitarian speeches at the Hague, they bombarded an open town, butchered women and children and completely ruined harmless merchants.

Undoubtedly, one must have foreseen in Paris that this brutal proceeding would produce not only in Morocco, but in the whole Mohammedan world, a movement not only inimical to foreigners in general but above all anti-French; this movement furnished the desired pretext for occupation, which, it is true, was officially declared to be a temporary one, but which, evidently, was to be made into a permanent one. At the Quay d'Orsay one has returned to the policy of M. Delcassé, but has hung the mantle of dissimulation around it. But one begins to discard even that. There is no longer any idea of impartiality in regard to the two pretenders. The French Government has arraigned itself openly on the side of Abdul Azis, who, discarded by his own people, has accepted French protection so as to save a semblance of sovereignty and perhaps his life.

Germany permits it to happen. She can do no otherwise. The time for diplomatic negotiations has passed. She can only choose between an intentional ignoring it and a war which latter the Emperor

does not desire, and the German public opinion would condemn. Germany's interest is too slight to justify the risk of an European conflict. Many regard it as absolutely nil. The Moroccan adventure will cost France a great deal of blood and money. Why should Germany dissuade her from an undertaking which will lay her lame along the Vogesan front for a long time to come.

GREINDL.

No. 45.

Berlin, May 10, 1908.

Baron Greindl.

Great hopes had been placed upon M. Cambon for the improvement of the relations with France. But to the contrary, he has shown himself suspicious, distrustful, scents everywhere similar intentions and is badly informed like all diplomats who make use of spies. His task is not being made easier by the attitude which the French Government has taken since the policy of the King of England has greatly diminished the stability of Europe.

Baron Greindl then discusses the meeting of the German Emperor and all other reigning German princes in Vienna on the occasion of the jubilee of the Austrian Emperor and further refers to the disregard of the agreement of Algeciras by France, to the remarkable English proposals in regard to Macedonia, the Serbian agitation in Croatia and to the false rumors spread by the Russian press about suppositious preparations for war by Turkey, which create the impression as if Russia wanted to rehabilitate her army still burdened by the results of her defeats in Manchuria.

GREINDL.

No. 46.

Berlin, May 13, 1908.

Letter of Baron Greindl's omitted. It treats of the reception of a Moroccan delegation but is of minor interest.

No. 47.

Berlin, May 30, 1908.

Baron Greindl.

After reviewing at length the reception and visit of the French President Fallières in England, Baron Greindl speaks of the protestations on the part of the three powers of the Entente that their alliance had no other significance excepting the preservation of the peace of Europe, a pretext which is contradicted by the wars of conquest in Manchuria, the Transvaal and Morocco. He further writes: They are the same powers, which, in conjunction with the United States (and which latter just about have their own war of robbery against Spain behind themselves) have posed as ultra-pacifists at the Hague. The Triple Alliance has assured the world's peace during thirty years, because it stood under the leadership of Germany, which was satisfied with the political disposition of Europe. The new grouping menaces it, because it is composed of powers, who desire a revision

of the Status Quo, and that to such an extent, that they have silenced the feelings of hatred of hundreds of years in order to materialize this desire.

GREINDL.

No. 48.

Berlin, June 12, 1908.

Baron Greindl.

In this report, Baron Greindl speaks of the meeting of the King of England and the Emperor of Russia at Reval on June 8th, and where again the same old protestations of good intentions and friendship have been aired. But here again the astute statesman continues: "The true intentions of the powers, which England has grouped for the isolation of Germany, are not to be found in the speeches of the sovereigns nor in the articles of the official or inspired newspapers. Their real intentions are so far away from the language they use, that they can't prevent exposing them unintentionally. If one wants to learn them, one need only to read the admonition which the "Temps" addressed to the King of Sweden. The Parisian newspaper regards the friendly feelings which His Majesty expressed for Germany as an insult to Russia which reflected upon France.

It would be presumptious if one should conclude from the mistrust, which exists between France, England and Russia, that the new triple alliance would not be brought about. The three powers are united by the common hatred against Germany and can find either real or imaginary security against the danger of becoming involved in war on account of foreign interests.

GREINDL.

No. 49

Berlin July 4, 1908.

Baron Greindl.

Yesterday I asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he had not as yet received the Russo-English proposals in regard to the Macedonian reforms, which interest us from the viewpoint of maintenance of correct relations between the High Powers. "I said that I was worried about another point and that was the manner in which the consultations between London and St. Petersburg were being conducted under the exclusion of Austria-Hungary, which, however, had an interest of the first order in the Balkan affairs." Mr. Von Schoen did not contradict me. He replied briefly that, apparently, nothing remained any more of the Muerzsteger agreement. I refrained, naturally, from a longer dalliance with this ticklish theme.

GREINDL.

No. 50

Berlin, July 18, 1908.

Baron Greindl.

Baron Greindl discusses in this report a conversation of one of his colleagues with Secretary of State Von Schoen in regard to the contemplated visit of the President with the Emperor of Russia and any possible political significance.

Baron Greindl's colleague called Von Schoen's attention to the fact that the visit of the President of the French Republic with the King of England had been regarded in Berlin as an event of serious significance.

Von Schoen replied that this had been, indeed, the case, but that the circumstances had been different. The personal policy of the King of England was outspoken anti-German. According to reports which had reached the German Government, England had intended going a great deal further by way of her entente with France and Russia than she actually had succeeded. France had declined. Before even any rumors of a compact had gained circulation and while President Fallières was still in London, Monsieur Cambon had sought M. Von Schoen and told him that the French Government was finding itself in a ticklish situation. Without offering any further explanation, he begged him not to believe any disturbing news which might reach him, but to be assured that France honestly desired peace." Baron Greindl then calls the attention of his chief, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the resignation of the English Ambassador in Berlin and says that the resignation was a voluntary one in form only. In reality, it had been demanded by the British Government on account of a decided pro-German attitude on the part of Sir Frank Lascelles. Baron Greindl concludes his resumé of Lascelles' attitude in the following words:

"The zeal which he developed in removing misunderstandings, which he pronounced as stupid and injurious in a high degree to both countries, does not correspond with the political attitudes of his ruler."

GREINDL.

No. 51

Paris, July 20, 1908.

A. Leghait.

Mr. Leghait states in his report, the departure from France of President Fallières and of his official visits with the Emperor of Russia and the Kings of Sweden, Denmark and Norway. This voyage, Mr. Leghait writes, was ostensibly one of courtesy, but really of a political character in so far as it was intended to prevent any too close and too friendly grouping of those countries under the wings of Germany. Both Fallières as well as Cambon would beg to assure everybody that the aim of France was the preservation of peace and that the French diplomacy would follow the lines of faithfulness to her associates and friends, etc.

But, says M. Leghait: "It is true that the French policy is lead by peaceful ideas, but will France, in the tow of England, remain master of the situation and be able to avoid any dangerous displeasure on the other side of the Rhine?"

LEGHAIT.

No. 52

Paris, October 8, 1908.

A. Leghait.

In connection with the communications which I had the honor of transmitting to you with my yesterday's report, I hasten to send

you several articles from to-day's Temps which have reference to the Balkan incident. The explanation of Mr. Iswolsky is the more interesting, as he has confirmed its correctness himself. From his explanation it appears, that the information which I gave you yesterday about the object which Russia pursues by her proposition for a call of a conference, had been correct, Russia desires to destroy the Berlin contract aimed against her own policy and counts upon the support of France and England. But the question is whether Germany will permit the destruction of the work of Prince Bismarck without punishment.

No. 53

Paris, January 19, 1909.

A. Leghait.

Mr. Leghait's report deals with the debates in the French Chamber of Deputies on the Moroccan policy, but is of minor interest.

LEGHAIT.

No. 54

Paris, February 13, 1909.

Baron Greindl.

Baron Greindl reports on the visit of the King and Queen of England to Berlin and states that during their four days' sojourn nothing had been left undone to make the reception of their Majesties as cordial as possible, etc.

With his usual skepticism, however, he goes on to say: The King of England avers that the maintenance of peace had always been the aim of his endeavors; he has always said that since the beginning of his successful diplomatic campaign, which he has successfully carried out for the isolation of Germany; but it cannot escape anybody that the world's peace has never been more seriously endangered than since the King of England has undertaken to strengthen it.

The visit of the King of England falls together with a considerable increase of the naval budget, with the building of ironclads of the dreadnought type, and with the formation of the strongest fleet that ever has existed and whose domestic harbor is in the North Sea and which is most adjacent to the German coast lines. Does this happen purely for the protection against a possible attack which Germany is not at all in a position to undertake?

The agitation for the creation of a territorial army still goes on. England does not need it for her defense. What does she want with it unless it be an ulterior motive in regard to an attack upon the continent?

These conjectures are forcing themselves upon one and make comprehensible why the Germans hesitate to consider the relaxation as an accomplished fact.

GREINDL.

No. 55

Berlin, February 17, 1909.

Baron Greindl.

Baron Greindl's report is rather unimportant, dealing chiefly with the impressions which the visit of the King of England to Berlin

had left behind. His Majesty, suffering with cold and fatigue, has not indulged in any political conversations and had only spoken a few minutes with the German Chancellor and those only to satisfy the demands of common courtesy.

GREINDL.

No. 56

Baron Greindl.

Berlin, March 22, 1909.

The newspapers are full of the debates which have taken place by the budget commission in the Reichstag at the same time that the transactions of Lower House occurred in England, I should only like to remark that when one hears the speakers who have detailed in London, how the English sea power must be organized to meet every danger, one might believe that Germany was, with the exception of Great Britain, the only power which possessed any navy at all.

GREINDL.

No. 57

Berlin, May 31, 1909.

In regard to the question of restricting naval preparations which had been asked of Chancellor Buelow, the latter had been forced to reply. He did so as briefly as possible, inasmuch as the Reichstag did not demand exhaustive details. In England, however, the same question called forth an extensive debate. Sir Edward Grey declared there was no reason for blaming Germany if she could not make the English viewpoint her own, but he expressed a lively regret that Germany had declined the English propositions.

The English press, which does not need to exercise the same reservations as the British Government, vents her bad humor by still plainer expressions, but Baron Greindl's conception of the situation is, "The attitude of mind in England reminds one of that in France during the years of 1866-1870. At that time the French believed themselves justified in preventing the re-establishment of unity in Germany, because they saw therein a menace of sovereignity which France had so far exercised upon the continent. In just the same light one regards to-day in London the refusal to remain dependent of the grace of England as an unfriendly act and a menace of the peace.

GREINDL.

No. 58

Berlin, April 1, 1909.

Significant in this report are Baron Greindl's statements in regard to the machinations of Iswolski and Sir Edward Grey to force Austria to a compromise which would have been humiliating to her. But these sinister intentions had been frustrated by the unmistakable and decisive attitude of Germany, which, notwithstanding all pressure, never had relinquished it. Germany alone has forced the peace. The Powers, which composed the re-grouping organized by the King of England, have measured their strength with the alliance of the European Central Powers and they have shown themselves inadequate in loosening this alliance. Hence the disgruntled sentiment.

GREINDL.

No. 59

Berlin, April 27, 1909.

Several days ago the Koelnishe Zeitung published a brief official article, stating that at the recent meeting of Prince Buelow and Mr. Titoni in Venice no mention of a renewal of the Triple Entente had been made. This was not necessary, but the result of the conference had been highly satisfactory. I did not write to you about it because that kind of information does not signify anything. It is the necessary outcome of any meeting between either sovereigns or leading statesmen .

For, as a matter of fact, a very long time neither Berlin or Vienna have had any illusions in regard to an eventual assistance on the part of Italy. The Quirinal has entered into obligations with England and France and has continually coquetted with London and Paris. Notwithstanding it adheres to the Triple Alliance as a guarantee of faith to its new friends who, however, only inspire it with limited confidence; it reserves itself the chance of putting itself on the side of the strongest, as, for instance, in Algeciras when it supported France and England, and, as recently, in the Oriental question, when it finally joined Germany and Austria the moment it became evident where the success would be and after having held a double-faced attitude.

Germany and Austria merely keep or suffer Italy in the Triple Alliance because her official withdrawal would signify a lessening of prestige and because one sees the possibility of having her as an opponent in the case of a conflict, but that is all one expects of her. On the other hand, one would not stand for her as earnestly as Germany did just now for Austria-Hungary; neither Vienna nor Berlin would compromise themselves for the sake of such a doubtful ally.

GREINDL.

No. 60

Berlin, June 21, 1909.

Baron Greindl.

The German Emperor reached Potsdam again day before yesterday after his visit with the Emperor of Russia. Both sovereigns expressed their intention of maintaining the traditionally friendly and trustful relations which exist between the two houses and which serve as a pledge for the good relations between the two countries for the preservation of peace.

Even the official notice which appeared yesterday in No. 142 of the "North German Gazette" has scarcely strayed from what, on such occasions, is always usual. It also states that the statesmen who accompanied the two emperors had naturally discussed the pending political questions. It was also recognized that the existing international agreements, in which Russia as well as Germany are concerned, are in no way opposed to these good relations.

In such a way Berlin has always contemplated the Triple Alliance which was formed solely and alone as a defensive contract. But this conception is by no means shared in Paris nor by its chief instigator, the King of England. The ill feeling which became evident

in France and England the moment that the contemplated conference became known, proves that the Triple Entente was regarded by both countries as something different from a contract which would place no obstacle for the maintenance of the traditional trustful friendship between Germany and Russia.

GREINDL.

No. 61

Paris, August 3, 1909.

By Count Arschot Schoonhoven, Belgian Charge d'Affaires in Paris.

As it had been announced a long time ago, the President of the Republic and the Emperor of Russia met in Cherbourg on the 31st of July. If one recalls the time of the first voyage of the Czar to Paris, the visits of Felix Faure to St. Petersburg and of Admiral Avelane in France, one must be astonished at the slight sensation which the meeting of the two sovereigns produced in the country. It is true, the newspapers concern themselves with it, but not more than with any other event, and there remains really nothing of the jag of enthusiasm which made the whole of France giddy during the beautiful days of the Russian Alliance.

ARSCHOT.

No. 62

Berlin, Nov. 7, 1910.

Baron Greindl.

Baron Greindl reviews in this report the visit of the Czar with the Emperor of Germany; this visit has been more significant than simply politic. During his brief sojourn, the Czar was accompanied by his new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Sazonow, who had also been received by the Emperor and the Chancellor. Baron Greindl surmises that during these meetings there had been, very likely, no scarcity of food for discussion. The events in Persia and the Far East, while politically of no importance to Germany, might, however, close those countries to German commerce. Russia always had looked upon the German railroad project with ill-concealed disapproval. All those problems, says Greindl, are too complex to be removed in the short period of two days, the bigger part of which was taken up by official ceremonies, etc. During the first three-fourths of the 19th century the alliance between Russia and Prussia had been a constant and sure factor in European politics. It did not rest only upon the common interests of both nations, but also upon the intimate friendship and family relations of the two reigning houses. This, especially, was the case during the reign of Emperor Nicholas I. These relations, however, suffered the first break when Prince Bismarck, during the Congress in Berlin, endeavored to bring Russia and England together, whereby as intermediator, he experienced the usual fate of being accused of partiality by both parties. In consequence, the Russian people, believing themselves despoiled of the fruits of their victories, developed a hatred against their Western neighbors which became still more augmented by envy which the rapid development of German power had called forth. At first

this rupture was comparatively slight, but it was, nevertheless, progressive, and finally led to Russia's alliance with France, the formation of the Triple Entente and, eventually, to the intervention by Germany in the question of the annexation of Bosnia.

In regard to the latter, a denial that pressure had been used had been entered. But, so Greindl continues, this is merely playing with words. Without Prince Buelow's explanation of the solidarity of Germany and Austria-Hungary and without the warning of the German Envoy, Count Pourtales, in St. Petersburg, Russia would not have desisted so suddenly from her agitations against Austria-Hungary in the small Slavonic states, and especially in Belgrade. The solution of the Bosnia question was a humiliation to Russia as well as a disappointment.

In summing up the balance of this lengthy report, Greindl comes to the conclusion that, no matter how affairs stood in the past, the grouping of the European Great Powers will remain as it was before and the feelings of the Russian people for Germany will, therefore, not become any more cordial. The language of the Russian newspapers proves this.

GREINDL.

No. 63

Berlin, March 3, 1911.

In this report Greindl deals with the appointment of Delcassé as Minister of the Marine, and discusses the possible attitude of the German Imperial Government which will, while refraining from even a semblance of mixing with the internal policies of France, no doubt do its own thinking. For years Delcassé has regarded her as a "Quantité negligeable" and prided himself with having effected an aggressive alliance against Germany.

But Delcassé's return to power need not to be taken too tragically. He is no longer entrusted with the Ministerium of Foreign Affairs. He has no longer King Edward VII at his side, whose co-worker he believed himself to be, and whose tool he was. Nevertheless, Delcassé is too ambitious and too unrestful a spirit not to endeavor to inculcate his ideas into his colleagues. Even public opinion in France seems bent upon a more active foreign policy. Up to a very short while ago Monsieur Pichon was extremely well liked, but no longer to-day. The result of the meeting in Potsdam, which he in no wise could have prevented, cannot be overlooked. This meeting never did need to disquiet anybody, if the Triple Entente, as it is asserted, had in view only the maintenance of peace. Since there has not appeared any change in the grouping of the powers, one should joyfully receive any approachment which would improve the German-Russian relations, but in Paris and London just the opposite is desired. The French press has devoted considerable applause in regard to the attempted fortification of Flushing, and nobody has made Pichon any reproaches for going rather precipitately into this adventure, but, rather, for not having had any success with it. It really looks as if Delcassé had been called into the ministerial office for the purpose of fostering this attitude of public opinion. He has not been

intrusted with foreign affairs. That would have been a challenge; but whatever could be done without breaking any glass has been done.

GREINDL.

No. 64

Paris, March 4, 1911.

Report of Baron Guillome, Belgian Ambassador in Paris.

Baron Guillome speaks of the attitude of the German press toward the new Ministry in France, and the persistence with which it asserts that the personality of Monsieur Delcassé was too pronounced not to exert a predominating influence upon the Ministry. He further refers to the incident of the "Fremden legion" with an admonition that it would be wise to keep an eye on it. He expresses the belief that the excitement over it would not go very deep in France and that public opinion will not be affected by it, but the press is making chauvinism and may use a few unfortunate expressions. "As I also hear there is being carried on persistently a veritable propaganda in Germany along the French border for the purpose of inducing desertion from the German Army into the French Legion."

GUILLAUME.

No. 65

Berlin, March 20, 1911.

Baron Greindl.

Baron Greindl refers in this report to the speech on foreign politics by Sir Edward Grey on the occasion of the debate on the Naval budget. He remarks on the fact that, with the exception of the "Nord Deutsch Zeitung," all other German papers had merely reported the gist of the speech without, however, any commentary.

The "North German Gazette," as the high official organ, alone expressed the satisfaction of the Imperial Government. It had to do this, for its silence would have been construed in London as an insult. Baron Greindl also speaks of the indifference of the German public, which, he says, has been blunted by the countless meetings and mutual exchanges of courtesies so that it would like to protect itself against fresh disappointments. Here, however, Baron Greindl refers to the second attempt made by England to draw Belgium into her meshes of intrigue. He says: "This mistrust can be explained, especially as the English Government only quite recently participated in the Flushing intrigue. The proof for this we have in the demarche which Sir A. Hardinge made with you (that is the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs) to draw us into it."

Greindl further remarks on Sir Edward Grey's speech which had not been confined to empty words as on former occasions. One action accompanied or, rather, preceded it: For years the English press has had the unheard of effrontery of supervising the completion of the Bagdad Railway and even to forbid it, that is, it wanted to lay hands upon an undertaking which concerned only Turkey, the Concession Company, and, directly, the German Government which supported it. Sir Edward Grey has reduced this question again to within

a legal province. He recognized that England possessed no title of right of mixing into an internal ottoman affair, and announced that England would confine herself to guarding her interests by legal measures.

The moment is very likely favorable for an attempt at bettering the German-English relations. There is, at present, no question on hand which might mitigate against it by possible friction.

"I beg to be permitted, sir, to invite your attention to the fact that this report is not intended to convey the impression that I regard an English-German approach as already effected or even imminent. Naturally, I would desire it with my whole heart, because the security of Belgium would thereby be considerably augmented."

GREINDL.

No. 66

Berlin, April 21, 1911.

Baron Greindl.

Several days ago the French press set rumors afloat, according to which France had the assurance of not having any interference by Germany in the execution of such measures which were deemed necessary for the solution of the present Moroccan crisis.

I do not believe that any one here has the slightest wish of entering actively into the Moroccan affairs. One must have lost here long since every illusion as to the value of the Algeciras Acts—even if one ever had any—which France has signed with the firm intention never to observe them. France has never ceased in pursuing her plans of annexation, be it, that she needed pretexts for grasping possessions which should endure forever, be it that she pressed concessions which brought the Sultan into submission to France, which gradually reduced him to the level of the Bey of Tunis. When the Imperial Government obligated itself at the Treaty of February 9, 1909, to place no obstacles in the way of the political interests of France in Morocco, it knew undoubtedly that the French Government would construe the clause as an encouragement to continue in the same way and that it would regard the promise of respecting Moroccan independence as a dead letter. A retroaction would be a cruel humiliation to France; Germany has no reason for imposing this upon France, and could anyhow not change her position after a tolerance of eight years without not being determined at the same time, to go to war. This would, be relatively, more than Morocco is worth.

If the French Government really is concerned in excluding the possibilities of a conflict, it is up to it of putting into broad daylight sufficient sagacity and simulated moderation not to force Germany from her passive attitude.

GREINDL.

No. 67

Paris, April 29, 1911.

The telegraph agencies inform you quicker than I can do it, of the various incidents, in consequence of which Morocco is keeping the government of the Republic busy to-day. Even if one considers

the national character of the French which continually drives them to exaggerate occurrences in which they are participating, one cannot deny that the situation in Morocco to-day is exceedingly complicated. The tribes are running race in their splitting up and in betrayal, and the problem is a difficult one for the power, which has taken over the mandate, or rather arrogated it, to re-establish order in Morocco.

So far, nothing justifies the apprehension that the French expedition could produce a change in international politics. Germany quickly observes what is going on, perhaps congratulates herself on the difficulties which press upon the shoulders of the government of the Republic, and desires nothing more than not to mix herself up with this question as long as she will not be forced to it by her economic interests.

England, which has pushed France into the Moroccan muddle, contemplates her work with satisfaction. Remains Spain. She is naturally not very well satisfied with the development which the procedure of France takes. She must recognize with regret that her means are far behind her ambitions and has to make a pleasant face to a bad play.

GUILLAUME.

No. 68

Berlin, May 1, 1911.

Baron Greindl.

Baron Greindl forwards under this date nothing but the translation of the leading article in the "North German Gazette" on the French-Moroccan entaglement, but at the end he emphatically reiterates that "French newspapers show much too plainly that the real reason of all is: the making of a second Tunis out of Morocco.

GREINDL.

No. 69

London, May 9, 1911.

Count Lalaing.

Count Lalaing reports from London with what interest as well as apprehension, the French campaign in Morocco is followed. Ostensibly there seems to be a great deal of apprehension that France might act thoughtlessly somewhere and give Germany thereby an opportunity for intervention.

But at the same time, one is far from believing that the German Government wanted war. One is convinced that the Emperor does not want it; but the question is whether the Berlin Cabinet might not, under certain circumstances, be led into temptation of making itself noticeable by some intervention or other, and of giving in this way a striking proof of its power which would be humiliating to the French Government and unpleasant to England and Russia.

An occupation of Fez, which, by way of example, awakened altogether too much the semblance of a final one, or a misdemeanor against the spirit if not the letter of the obligations entered into in Algeciras, might offer Berlin an opportunity for intervention.

LALAING.

No. 70

Berlin, May 10, 1911.

Baron Greindl.

You will have read the news in certain papers, which were put into circulation by a recently established news agency, according to which Germany intended sending three cruisers into the Moroccan waters. You have, no doubt, also read the high official denial in the "North German Gazette," which denounces this invention as a dangerous mischief, of which every half-way politically thinking man must say what an enormous responsibility he takes upon himself when he launches such freely invented sensational news on so serious a question as the Moroccan.

Baron Greindl then discusses the situation at length and refers, especially, to the contemplative attitude of Germany, which is beginning to become more and more disturbing to the French as they are getting themselves deeper and deeper into the Moroccan mire. Greindl in speaking of the complaining French Envoy to Berlin (Jules Cambon, a brother of the French Envoy to London) says: "Does he expect, then, to get a sort of open information in full? If one had any such hopes in Paris, one must have lost sight of the beginning of the question. It began with the agreement between England, France and Spain in 1904 when no one took the trouble of consulting the other interested powers or even of informing them. Up to the moment when Germany raised her objections, it was openly avowed that Morocco would become a second Tunis." Aside from the public understanding, France formed a secret treaty with Spain (a but poorly protected secret) about the division of the Sherefic Empire. The compact of Algeciras changed nothing of the original French plans, only it was necessary to obtain, slowly and step by step, that which had been expected by one fell stroke. Little by little the French took possession of everything there, and made use of every opportunity which offered itself to them, to proceed to occupation of territories so far as they had not induced it themselves.

"I remain further convinced that Germany aims to avoid being forced into a serious intervention in the Moroccan affair, but I have to repeat what I wrote in my report of May 1st and that is: That the question is nevertheless an extremely ticklish one. It is even becoming more so; in order that the Imperial Government may be able to justify its inactivity before the German public opinion, it will be necessary for France to operate very cleverly and to simulate moderation, not to force it from this attitude. Recently, however, neither the French Government nor a large part of the French press have acted correspondingly."

GREINDL.

No. 71

London, May 22, 1911.

Count Lalaing.

This report of Count Lalaing records the visit of the German Emperor and Empress in London, and describes the difference between this and the last visit in November, 1907. During the latter

visit, a cold mistrust had characterized the attitude of the people; on this occasion the sentiment was more cordial. The absence of all military display greatly contributed to the cordiality.

The death of King Edward appears to have brought about a lessened tension in the German-English relations. It appears that at the time of the Ententes, with which the deceased sovereign was so enamoured, the people themselves were conscious of the endeavor to encircle Germany, an endeavor which the London Cabinet so often encouraged, and necessarily disgruntled the Berlin Cabinet. One was somewhat afraid of the possible consequences, and from fear to hatred there is but a step. The Anti-German press never failed to see to it that the step was made.

It would appear, however, that the public began to collect itself a little, and just at a most propitious moment there appeared William II, without any glittering accoutrements, in ordinary citizen's dress and escorted the Empress and the Princess with the children of the Royal English House through the streets of London. The result was excellent, even if it only lasted for a moment.

The grandchild of Queen Victoria need not regret the step he made under such favorable conditions.

LALAING.

No. 72

Berlin, June 17, 1911.

Baron Greindl.

As far as can be judged, the attitude of Germany has not changed in regard to the Moroccan affair. The rumor that Spain had been supported by Germany in her military action was immediately denied. That was scarcely necessary. Neither at the time of the conclusion of the secret treaties nor by the transactions, has Germany had any reason to be satisfied with the attitude of the Spanish Government. It was improbable in the highest degree that Germany should go into action to defend the interests of Spain, when she did not find it expedient to do it for the sake of her own interests.

On the other hand, Monsieur Cambon takes the trouble, day by day, as Herr Zimmermann told me yesterday, of explaining that there was an essential difference between the French and the Spanish actions in Morocco. The one was a flagrant rupture of the Algeciras acts, whereas the other was only their execution." The Under Secretary of State (Zimmerman) told me: "I am listening to these explanations very seriously," and to emphasize that he spoke ironically he quickly added that it was really refreshing to listen to the plaidoyers in this process of falsehoods.

The German Government stands pat in its viewpoint. It plays the role of a simple spectator and reserves its freedom of action in case that the fundamental principles of the Algeciras acts, that is, the sovereignty of the Sultan and the integrity of Morocco should cease to exist as a consequence of the French intervention.

To-day already, there is nothing more left of it. When will Germany deem the moment as having come that she should express it and what use will she make of the liberty which she has regained?

I have now as ever the conviction that Germany's chief concern is to avoid a war, which Morocco is not worth, and which France can save Europe from, that she proceeds with as much dissimulation as is necessary not to put the German public opinion into an uproar.

GREINDL.

No. 73

Paris, July 2, 1911.

Baron Guillaume.

I need not inform you that the news of the dispatch of a German warship to Agadir, which became known here last night, is occupying the Parisian press exclusively. The incident is evidently serious; it may acquire extraordinary significance unless it is the result of an understanding between the Cabinets of Berlin and London.

For a long time it had been considered as a firmly established principle, that England would never permit any foothold of the Germans at any point of the Moroccan territory. In case that this policy had been abandoned, what had been the provision with which it had been paid for?

After further consideration of this event, Baron Guillaume states: That Monsieur Jaures was triumphing to-day. (Jaures, a Socialist leader, was assassinated at the beginning of the war, 1914.)

Jaures has always thrown it up to the Government that it was compromising itself in this hateful Moroccan affair; he has always maintained the opinion that no necessity for the march upon Fez had ever existed and that the advance of the French Army might be the source of serious difficulties.

To-day it is incontestable that the landing of the Spaniards in Larasch and the dispatch of a German warship to Agadir has been induced, or made possible, by the attitude of the French Government.

GUILLAUME.

No. 74

London, July 5, 1911.

Count Lalaing.

Count Lalaing reports on the sensation which the sending of a German warship to Agadir had produced in London, and that it had been akin to that which the occupation of Fez by French troops and the appearance of Spanish battalions at Larasch had produced at the time. The English press is not satisfied with Germany's proceeding, denies the existence of any unrest in the region of Agadir and speculates already on the possibility of a division of Morocco, whereby there or elsewhere an indemnity for the German Empire would have to be found.

Count Lalaing further dwells upon the difficulties of the situation for not only the Prime Minister, Asquith, but also that of Sir Edward Grey, who would have to make some explanations in the Lower House. It is not desirable to disturb the German relations which recently have improved; on the other hand, it must not have the appearance of not standing by France.

LALAING.

No. 75

Paris, July 8, 1911.

Baron Guillaume.

Guillaume reports the return of the President and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic from their visit to the Netherlands. He states that it will soon be known in which manner the Government of the Republic will reply to the information by the Berlin Cabinet on account of German intervention in Morocco.

He says that people are not lacking who think that the attitude of the Paris Cabinet had not been very large-minded, and that the emphasis with which it had been pointed out, that France without asking Russia or England could not have reached a decision, had been very little worthy of the role of a Great Power.

One wished to gain time, one asked advice right and left, and, eventually, turned, thanks to Delcassé's anglomania, to Great Britain. I have reason for the assumption that Monsieur Caillaux (the new French Premier) has already reached the point of regretting the emphatic manner with which this step had been taken and the attitude which the Cabinet of St. James had assumed. There is a great deal less chance of reaching an understanding with Germany, if England participates in the conversation, and I am of the firm conviction that both Caillaux and de Selves regret the turn which their predecessors have given to the Moroccan question: They were quite ready to give in, provided it could be done without humiliation.

GUILLAUME.

No. 76

London, July 8, 1911.

Count Lalaing.

In addition to his letter of May 5th, Count Lalaing reports a part of the speech which the English Prime Minister, Asquith, made in the Lower House. In it Asquith says that the recent events in Moroccan affairs have created a new situation, but is convinced that diplomacy will solve the difficult problem and that he would see to it that the English interests would be protected and the obligations to France carried out.

Lalaing then says: It is interesting to state that Mr. Asquith lays stress upon the new situation, which could indirectly influence the interests of England. The thought that Agadir could become, by certain eventualities, a basis for the German fleet is apt to disturb the Government of the United Kingdom.

The press reminds that Great Britain has disinterested herself in the Moroccan question in favor of France, because the Republic on her part had left England a free hand in Egypt, but that England had never contemplated permitting Germany to gain a foothold in Morocco.

LALAING.

No. 77

Paris, July 24, 1911.

Baron Guillaume.

So far the Cabinets of Berlin and Paris have not made any official announcement of their "conversation" and one has to be satisfied

with press notices, most of which are only tentative, and others may be inspired merely as trial balloons. It may, however, be well to infer, since the oft-repeated rumor has never been denied, that Germany demands of France a "compensation" on the African coast in the Congo. The French newspapers protest against it, and allege that they could not understand why the Imperial Government should demand a compensation.

To those who admit that France went to Fez without any serious grounds, it is clear that she scarcely will come out of it again, or if she does, that she may find herself forced to return there, and that she breaks in this way the spirit of the contract of Algeciras. If Germany, in the face of these facts, demands any compensation, it means that she will not force any retreat of France, but also that she herself has no intention of settling herself in Agadir. But she is of the opinion that the French Government has disturbed all agreed equilibrium of the powers and demands her share.

As soon as the news of the dispatch of a German cruiser to Agadir became known, I had the honor of writing to you that, in my opinion, the kernel of the question was to find out how the proceeding would be received in London, and I reminded you that Great Britain had never admitted the possibility of Germany taking the least possession on the Moroccan coast.

GUILLAUME.

No. 78

London, July 24, 1911.

Count Lalaing.

From the article in the "Times" of July 20th, to which I had the honor of calling your attention, you have been able to draw a picture of how much the suppositious demands of Germany have been exaggerated. A member of the Cabinet also, the impulsive Secretary of the Treasury has played upon them in a speech at a banquet in the city. After expressing his sympathy for the principles of the Court of Appeal and his best wishes for a favorable result of the negotiations which Sir Edward Grey had opened with the United States, Mr. Lloyd George added that, in his opinion, Great Britain would have to uphold her prestige as a World Power at any price. In order to maintain peace, one could afford to make some sacrifice, but England would have to pay too dearly if she should be considered as not having any significance in the Concert of the Powers.

COUNT LALAING.

No. 79

Paris, July 28, 1911.

Baron Guillaume.

Yesterday I had the opportunity of meeting several of my colleagues and, especially, those who are usually best informed. They admitted not having any exact knowledge of the status of the pending negotiations on account of Morocco. Never was a secret so carefully guarded, never was secrecy so absolute, France will not and cannot wish that the negotiations fail completely. Her Government

knows that war would mean the last hour of the Republic. I have the greatest confidence in the peaceful inclinations of Emperor William, notwithstanding certain exaggerations in his demeanor which are not infrequent. He is not going to let himself be carried any further than he will by the overflowing temperament and the heavy hand of his exceedingly smart Minister of Foreign Affairs (Secretary of State v. Kiderlen-Waechter.)

And so it has been always.

Germany can just as little go to war on account of Morocco as to enforce the bill of compensation, the payment of which she desires because of the more or less final occupation of the Fez by the French.

In general I have very little confidence in the peaceful intentions of Great Britain, which rather likes to see when the others are swallowing each other. But in this case it would be difficult for England —nay, I might say impossible, not to intervene with arms.

Just as I accepted it from the very first day, the crucial point of the situation is in London. Only there it can become serious. The French will give in all points to keep peace. Not so the English who will not recede from certain principles and demands. But it is not desirable to drive them to the utmost.

GUILLAUME.

No. 80.

Paris, August 10, 1911.

Baron Guillaume.

In my report of July 8 I had the honor of writing you that according to my informations, Monsieur Caillaux had exceedingly regretted, that the Government had so emphatically insisted of getting its cue for its attitude on the dispatch of a German warship to Agadir in London; and that, at the time, he had in no way approved of the attitude assumed by the Cabinet of St. James.

This information seems to be verified. I have been assured that England, at first hand, proposed to France that both Governments should dispatch at once two warships each to Agadir. The Paris Cabinet had offered the liveliest resistance to this proposition, and, there it had remained.

France has the good fortune of being represented in Berlin and London by two of its ablest diplomats, the Brothers Cambon, etc., etc.

GUILLAUME.

No. 81.

Berlin, October 12, 1911.

Baron Guillaume.

That part of the German-French agreement, as far as it relates to Morocco itself, was made public by von Kiderlen-Waechter and Monsieur Cambon yesterday at noon. A high official communication of the "North German Gazette" announced the fact on the same evening.

The opimism of the Secretary of State was therefore justified. It is hoped that it will be equally so for that part of the transactions which are now beginning and which concern the territorial compensations demanded by Germany.

The tone of the French press fills me in this respect with serious apprehension. With a daily increasing vehemence, it is arming itself against any reduction of the present French colonial possessions, and appears to have completely lost sight of the real status of the question. In Berlin one regards the informations given to the French press as untimely and regrettable but one does not deny them. In the main, at least, they will have to be regarded as correct. In accordance with it, Germany would have received the assurance of free trade in Morocco on equal footing with France and the other interested countries. This was offered her already by the Treaty of Algeciras in confirmation of that of Madrid. These international conclusions guaranteed her besides the independence of the Sultan and the integrity of the Moroccan territory. Actually there exists neither the one nor the other of these promises any longer, but, theoretically, they still continue to exist. Germany concedes a great deal to France when she relinquishes them by her acquiescence to the establishment of a French protectorate over Morocco. The Imperial Government has apparently taken precautions that the Berlin promises should be kept better than those of Algeciras which were being systematically violated from the very first day. The agreement to these conditions is not a French concession, as one likes to believe it to be in Paris, at most, it is a limitation of the German concessions. Germany alone has made such heretofore.

The French are now in line to make concessions which must consist in the secession of the promised territory. The Parisian newspapers seem to have forgotten entirely, that both parts of the planned treaty are indissolubly bound together, but, here one is, undoubtedly, not willing to separate them from each other.

GREINDL.

No. 82.

London, November 18, 1911.

Count Lalaing.

When I returned in September to my post, I heard from various sources that the general political situation had been regarded a few weeks ago as sufficiently serious to cause the English Government to take extraordinary precautions. I am informed from absolutely reliable sources that the officers of the active army had suddenly been recalled from their furlough at that time, that the purchase of horses for the cavalry was taking place and that the squadron of the North Sea had temporarily been put in readiness for war.

Several delegates had insisted in the Chamber that the Government should enlighten the nation as to what had occurred this summer between the Cabinets of London, Berlin and Paris, for after the publicity of the famous speech by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Lloyd George, the Parliament had not received any further information.

LALAING.

No. 83.

London, November 28, 1911.

Count Lalaing.

This letter reports on the speech of Sir Edward Grey which had been awaited with considerable impatience in London, Berlin and Paris, and which, eventually, showed the suspicious and arrogant attitude of Sir Grey in an unmistakable manner. The speech dealt chiefly with the Moroccan question but, eventually, it included Persia and Tripoli. Grey, of course, gave his English version, which, as he states and as had to be expected, differs not immaterially from the German. Lalaing says: "The German representation may be comprised in a few words. On June 30th Germany informed the powers which had signed the Treaty of Algeciras, of the dispatch of the 'Panther' to Agadir for the purpose of protecting the German subjects and which were being menaced by the natives there. The Imperial Government had no intention of territorial conquests. On the 21st of July, Sir Edward Grey begged information of Count Metternich as to the length of the presence of the gun boat. He added that in case of the German-French negotiations should miscarry, the question of Agadir would become acute, and demanded that England should participate in the negotiations. The German demand appeared to be unacceptable to France.

On the same evening July 21st consequently before the meeting between Sir Edward Grey and Count Metternich in Berlin could have been known, Mr. Lloyd George made his famous speech which made a disagreeable impression upon the Imperial Government.

The German Government instructed its Ambassador on the 24th to declare that Germany was not contemplating the acquisition of territory in Morocco, but desired that Sir Edward Grey should refrain from speaking of it before the Chamber, so as not to create the impression as if the German Government had receded from such intentions on account of the menacing tone of Lloyd George.

Count Lalaing now proceeds to give the English version of the Moroccan question and directly charges the British Prime Minister with intentional misinterpretation of Germany's aversions; in fact, he plainly indicates that Prime Minister lied.

Sir Grey's English presentation: "According to him the German presentation is incomplete. From a verbal communication of the German Ambassador on July 1st, he concluded that the German Cabinet by the dispatch of a gunboat to Agadir contemplated a division of Morocco. (Sir Edward Grey does not seem to have understood that the vessel had only transiently sojourned in Agadir.) On July 4th, Sir Grey told Count Metternich that new complications had arisen which affected the English interests which would be probed in the Ministerial Council. Later on the press announced that Germany had made unacceptable propositions to France in regard to the French Congo and on July 21st the English Minister informed the Ambassador that the presence of a German ship in Agadir would be disturbing on account of the possibility that the pending German-French negotiations might be broken. On the same day, Lloyd George made his speech, and simply said that as soon as English interests were at

stake, the English Government could not be regarded inconsequentially. On the day that an English Chancellor could no longer use such language, England would no longer be a great nation."

In view of the tone of the German disclosures, Sir Edward Grey was of the opinion that it would not be compatible with the dignity of the British Government to make explanations about the speech of Lloyd George.

From the polemic over the German and English representation in the consultations between Count Metternich and Sir Edward Grey, it appears that the latter did not at once understand, on July 1st, that Germany promised to recall her warship as soon as order had been established again in Morocco, and that this promise according to German conception had been equivalent with the declaration that the German Government did not aspire to the establishment of a base of fleet in Agadir. Sir Edward Grey contends that he had received this assurance only on July 24th.

LALAING.

No. 84.

London, November 30th, 1911.

Count Lalaing.

In his capacity as Chief of the Opposition Party in the Upper House, Lord Lansdowne declared himself as being satisfied with the speech of Sir Edward Grey. The liberal Lord Courtney of Penrith, a friend of Germany, attacked the policy of the Government, because it had in view the isolation of Germany. (This truth is seldom heard in the English Parliament) and because it had not stood by the acts of Algeciras. Sir Edward Grey should have restrained the Parisian Cabinet, as it had held the determination of these international acts too highly. Then the friction with Berlin would have been avoided, and, in all probability the Italian Expedition to Tripoli would never have taken place. Blind indulgence toward the French intentions had brought about the regrettable tension with Germany.

These truths have, by no means been to the taste of the House of Lords.

But one part of Lord Lansdowne's speech is noteworthy, namely, that the given promise of a simple diplomatic support might readily lead to another kind of help (real military or maritime).

One need only read between the lines to understand that in the opinion of Lord Lansdowne, one of its founders, one could declare the "Entente cordiale," without its being an alliance, eventually as operating as a consummated treaty of defense between the two countries.

LALAING.

No. 85.

Berlin, December 6, 1911.

Count Lalaing.

In his report Baron Greindl refers to the bad impression which Sir Edward Grey's speech had made in Germany. These impressions are lasting. But the German Chancellor had succeeded in avoiding

in his own speeches everything which might have injured public opinion in England. He made allusions to the fact that the agreement with France would reflect favorably upon the relations between England and Germany.

In short and discreet form the wish was herewith expressed to bury the hatchet and begin a new era of good relations between the two countries.

"It was positively impossible to reject the advances of von Bethmann-Holweg without, so to speak, demolishing glass windows. Mr. Asquith and the leader of the opposition, Mr. Bonar Law, have accepted it in a friendly manner. Sir Edward Grey endeavored to be correct, but displayed a noticeable coolness, but, anyhow he said that he would be prepared to do everything in his power to improve the English-German relations. The existing friendship of Great Britain, to whom he intended to remain faithful, prevented him from forming new friendships. Far away from any intention of disturbing the recent transactions between Germany and France, he had, on the contrary, rejoiced over the accomplished understanding. He understood the necessity of expansion of Germany and had no intention of putting obstacles in her way. He even indicated the territory upon which the German colonial expansion could take place. It is in Africa where England does not think of extending her possessions. ("Are they perhaps our possessions which he intends to juggle away according to the principles of the new international law and it is interpreted in London, and, unfortunately, also elsewhere?) in Morocco, Tripoli, Persia. As Sir Edward Grey said he did not believe in any plans of Germany inimical to England. England had just as little any inimical intentions toward Germany and he would not give any support to a third power whose attitude was inimical or challenging.

If Sir Edward Grey had stopped right here, it would have been excellent, but his whole speech was permeated by an undisguised sentiment of distrust toward Germany, and his utterances were weakened by reservations which completely annulled their significance. So, for instance, he put up as a condition for the approachment with Germany the demand that his two French and Russian friends should be included, as if it was not generally known that no French Government would risk lending itself to any such attempts, which would, at once, be declined by French public opinion.

The attention of the German press centered itself exclusively upon those parts of the speech in which the leader of the Foreign Office manifested his unshakeable intention of continuing the policy of the "Entente cordiale," which later on grew to be a Triple Entente, which had been inaugurated by King Edward VII, with the help of the Conservative Party and whose heirloom the Liberals have taken over. Sir Edward Grey declared that there existed, outside of the public agreement, no secret treaty between England and France. I do not doubt his sincerity, but it is nevertheless true that either with or without written or verbal obligations everybody in England or France considers the "Entente cordiale" as a defensive as well as offensive compact against Germany. This corresponds exactly with the character which the deceased King of England had meant to give it. The

"Entente cordiale" has not been built upon the positive foundation of a defense of common interests but upon the negative one of hatred against the German Empire. If it had been conceived differently in Paris, it would not have been accepted there as such an important diplomatic success which thereby could even extinguish the humiliation of Faschoda. The "Entente cordiale" has reawakened in France the slumbering ideas of revenge. From it arises also the state of unrest and uncomfortable feeling in which Europe has found itself during the last seven years. Sir Edward Grey has adopted this tradition without reservation. He thinks it is in consonance with English interests. He believes no longer in the old system of "Splendid isolation," and the majority of the English people side with him. The conservatives and liberals approve of his attitude and only the working party and radicals criticise it.

For the present it must be regarded as fixed that in London the plan has taken root to come to the aid of France in a war against Germany by the landing of a corps of 150,000 English. Herein lies nothing surprising. It is only the continuation of similar propositions, which were made to General Ducarne a few years ago by Colonel Bernadiston, likewise the continuation of the Flushing intrigue.

Sir Edward Grey has just as little succeeded to prove that the speech of Lloyd George in the Mansion House had not been a challenge and a threat.

Von Bethmann-Hollweg, in his address on November 9th, made the task easier for Sir Grey by referring to this speech as a dinner toast which had received significance only through English and French press comments.

Sir Edward Grey found it proper to let it be known that the toast had been neither an impressive improvisation nor the personal opinion of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and that, indeed, the text had been discussed and agreed upon between the Prime Minister and himself.

Should the agreement really have been made easier that England would butt in to a conference about Morocco, where she had renounced all political demands, or was it an attempt to intervene in favor of France?

Did it not mean perhaps to arrogate a right of veto against Germany's enterprises when one shrieks blood and murder because a German cruiser dropped anchor at the wharf of Agadir, while England, without batting an eye, looked complacently on the progressive conquest of Moroccan territory by France and Spain under the destruction of the independence of the Sultan? England could not act otherwise. She was bound to France by her secret treaty. The explanation is very simple but, by no means, suited to allay the disturbance in Germany. From all this, it is perfectly clear that at the moment of signing the Algeciras acts, at least three of the powers concerned in it entered into an agreement which was not compatible with the promises which they had published. Those are the accusations of the German people against England as the press puts them in to expression. The Foreign Office had every means at command of informing itself of the fact that Germany only desired to secure better

the principle of the open door in the interest of all powers, England included, and to obtain a territorial compensation in Equatorial Africa, which, as Sir Edward Grey declared, did not interest him. The English Secretary of State would have saved himself the trouble, of which he spoke, if he had placed a little more confidence in the information which had been made to him at the moment of the dispatch of the "Panther" to Agadir. The silence, which followed and of which Sir Edward Grey complains, was a mutual one. It would never have evoked so much excitement if it had not been broken by the sensational toast of a prominent member of the English Cabinet.

Sir Edward Grey says England could not permit that a question, which affected her interests, could be regulated without her participation. Von Bethmann-Hollweg replies that Germany had never thought of disputing it, but that Germany demanded the same considerations for herself. The difficulties of the Moroccan affairs had arisen from the fact that England and France had wanted to regulate them without caring in the least about the German interests. Now, the crisis had passed; the Chancellor joins the English Prime Minister in the wishes of seeing the re-establishment of friendly relations between the two countries. It would, however, be necessary that England should adjust her policy to these wishes. The expansion of Germany is a fact with which the other nations would have to count. Nothing could hinder it. An experience of forty years had shown what the German policy desired. The strength of the Empire was a pledge of peace because it prevented the picking of a quarrel with it.

GREINDL.

No. 86.

Berlin, December 9, 1911.

Baron Greindl.

Sir Edward Grey has, at Plymouth, briefly replied to the speech which the German Chancellor had made in the Reichstag on the German-English relations.

Baron Greindl voices his opinion of the reply as follows: That which stands forth plainest in the speech of Sir Edward Grey is: that he intends to continue the policy of the "Triple Entente" in the same spirit with which he has conducted it so far and that is in the German hostile sense.

The address of von Bethmann-Hollweg is no less clear, he is by no means disposed to recognize the right of veto which England arrogates to herself toward the German enterprises and that he does expect for an approachment of the English Government not words but deeds.

Between the two peoples there exists just as little mutual understanding as between the two governments. The English continue to regard the expansion of Germany with jealous looks. The German was, by no means, hostile to the English six months ago. But he has become so now. The relations have, consequently, returned to the point of frigid correctness where they were before the crisis. They have become worse and as I fear for a long time to come.

GREINDL.

No. 87.

London, January 15, 1912.

Count Lalaing.

County Lalaing reports on the effect which the French Ministerial crisis had produced in England, and refers to the fact that Monsieur Caillaux had evidently endeavored to enter into negotiations with Germany with a view of favoring the latter with far reaching concessions. These disclosures, naturally, could not help but produce rather painful admissions that the loyalty of the English Cabinet, as far as it could be sincere, had somewhat miscarried. Lalaing says of it: "No one cares today to admit that one has been, apparently, more popish than the pope, and more irreconcilable than the friend whom one wished to help." It is distinctly disagreeable to have been made a fool of, even only for a short while. Lalaing further reports that there are a number of newspapers which assert that Sir Edward Grey had played a short sighted policy in taking such an attitude with a government (meaning the French) which might have brought about war. These occurrences are now being exploited by those publicists who are doubting the value of the "Entente Cordiale," they will also furnish proof to that small group of writers which contended that it would have been more advantageous for England if she had, without breaking the friendly relations with France, entertained more friendly ones toward Germany.

"The Entente, which was, solely and alone, intended to dispel certain sharply defined clouds, was not a treaty. The mistake of the government of Mr. Asquith was to actually consider it such with the results that by it had arisen in Berlin a serious antagonism toward Great Britain."

LALAING.

No. 88.

Berlin, February 9, 1912.

Count Lalaing.

Count Lalaing reports the departure from England of the Minister of War, Lord Haldane, for Berlin and the speculations as to the reasons for it:

1. An exchange of views on the German-English mobilization.
2. To ask the pardoning of a recently condemned English spy by the name of Stewart.
3. To bring about a German-English Entente.
4. To bring about a division of the Portuguese Colonies.
5. On account of boundary adjustment in Africa.
6. To cede Whale Bay to Germany.
7. Or finally, to deliver a personal message of King George to Emperor William.

Whatever the reason, the real aim is a friendly one. Of all English Ministers, the War Minister is the friendliest to Germany. Lord Haldane had studied at Heidelberg, speaks German fluently and has lots of personal friends in Berlin.

LALAING.

No. 89.

London, February 13, 1912.

Count Lalaing.

It is interesting to state how unpopular Sir Edward Grey has become with the extreme left of his party. The "Daily News" says that present events proved how little faith could be placed in the promises of the leader of the Foreign Office, and that from now on, Sir Edward Grey had made himself impossible as such."

The same paper takes today a speech of Lord Rosebery's in Glasgow as an incentive to further attacks upon Sir Edward Grey. In this speech Lord Rosebery criticises the foreign policy of Great Britain with its tangled Entente system, which brings about such heavy responsibilities. The paper regrets the results of the policy of the Minister which opposes the "Triple Entente" to the Triple Alliance," which hinders the development of Germany and which had brought the country to the verge of war during the previous summer. Consequently Sir Edward Grey's policy had to bring Great Britain to the necessity of not only augmenting the fleet but also of introducing compulsory military service. On this account the "Daily News" demands Sir Edward Grey's resignation.

LALAING.

No. 90.

London, February 16, 1920.

Count Lalaing.

In this letter, Count Lalaing reports the results of the visit of the Minister of War, Lord Haldane, to Germany, and that Mr. Asquith had confirmed the impression that the main reason for the visit had been to establish a more friendly exchange, and to lessen the existing tension between the two countries. It was natural to suppose that such an object could be much easier accomplished by the visit of an English Cabinet Minister to Germany.

The Premier bethought himself to add that even if the two nations had the desire of seeing better relations arise between them, it did not concern itself, by any means, to change the special relation, Germany's and Great Britain's, toward other powers; but both states proved at the time what might possibly happen.

LALAING.

No. 91.

Berlin, April 26, 1912.

Baron Greindl.

This report, evidently the last of Baron Greindl's, deals with the transactions in the Reichstag on proposals for armaments. It is not important, and therefore, omitted.

Evidently Baron Greindl was replaced as Ambassador by Baron Beyens.

No. 92.

Berlin, June 28, 1912.

Baron Beyens, Belgian Ambassador in Berlin.

Will Baron von Marshall, in the course of his London mission, succeed in bringing about an approachment of the German and British

Governments? Undoubtedly, no one desires this any more than the Emperor. One is bound to acceed to his Majesty in all justice that he never permits an opportunity to escape without addressing publicly a few gracious or flattering words to the English. The recent regattas in Kiel afforded him twice an occasion to praise the British Navy.

The English Ambassador appeared to me to be rather skeptical in regard to the result of the mission. "What makes the re-establishment of the former amicable understanding so difficult," Sir Edward Goschen said, "is the fact that between the two nations exists no real ground for irritation or estrangement. With Germany, we did not have to regulate so painful an incident, as that of Fashoda. The misunderstandings arose at the time of the Krueger telegram by the Emperor. That was for us like an enlightenment, which showed us the abyss, which opened in all silence and without our noticing it, between ourselves and the German people.

"The question of restriction of the German Navy is not solvable. We have no kind of right to force such upon the Imperial Government. We simply have to follow her upon the road to ruin, for England's welfare depends upon her preponderance at sea.

"Another, perhaps deeper lying reason for the repellent attitude of the English people against the German, Sir Edward Goschen has passed over in silence, namely; the competition in the fields of industry and commerce. With easily understood envy, England sees how a European people in competition in the world's market is gaining ground year by year, and, therefore, in this respect also menaces the position of world power which she had secured for herself."

Although the German products do not possess as yet the same quality, they attain gradually the value of the English wares of the same kind, the price of which has remained higher; therefore, the mark of origin "Made in Germany," and introduced by the British Government, has, apparently, brought about the fact that in the English Colonies today the German wares are preferred to those of the motherland on account of their seductive cheapness.

BEYENS.

No. 93.

Berlin, October 18, 1912.

Baron Beyens.

The relations between France and Germany did not exactly improve during last summer. The first result of the Balkan crisis was an approach between the Imperial Government and the French Republic. Actuated by the mutual desire of localizing the conflict in the Balkan Peninsula and avoiding a European war, they agreed to influence for the same purpose their respective allies, Russia and Austria, and participated at the same time in the measures which had been undertaken in Constantinople and the capitals of the Balkan countries.

It was not the fault of the Imperial Government that the crisis of 1909, brought about the annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina, did not find a better solution. Germany had offered to the Parisian Cabinet to mutually intervene in St. Petersburg with the object of

causing Russia to take a different attitude. Only after Monsieur Pichon had declined this mutual step, the Berlin Cabinet decided in favor of the well-known step, that is, unconditional intervention for Austria. I deem it useful to restate the truth about this historical fact. I have heard it a few days ago at the French Ambassy.

BEYENS.

No. 94.

Berlin, October 24, 1912.

Baron Beyens.

The French Ambassador who must have particular grounds for his words has told me repeatedly that the greatest danger for the maintenance of the European peace was the lack of discipline and personal politics of the Russian representatives in foreign countries. They are nearly all red-hot pan-Slavists, and upon them, for the most part, must be shouldered the responsibility for the present events. They will, no doubt, secretly influence their country to an intervention in the Balkan conflict.

BEYENS.

No. 95.

London, October 31, 1912.

Count Lalaing.

Count Lalaing states in this report that yesterday one of the numerous meetings presided over by the former Ambassador to Berlin, Sir Frank Lascelles, had taken place in the Guildhall. These meetings are held by the society to bring about a better German-English understanding. But Lalaing says that during the previous week, Field Marshal Lord Roberts had made a war-like speech which had produced considerable sensation. Count Lalaing calls him an old man, playing the role of an "enfant terrible."

Lord Roberts had declared in a dramatic and prophetic tone that Germany was only waiting for the moment, when her armaments at sea were completed to attack Great Britain, etc., etc. Lalaing says that under such, to say the least, unpropitious circumstances, the conference of the society had taken place, but that the honey-sweet words, heard there, would have no effect to efface the impression of the vehement sputterings of Lord Roberts from the public mind, sputterings which keep public opinion in a state of continual distrust.

LALAING.

No. 96.

Berlin, November 30, 1912.

Baron Beyens.

Even if the voyage of the Arch-duke, successor to the throne Austria had been made to Germany under the pretext of a hunting invitation by the Emperor, it had, nevertheless, this year on account of the Balkan War and the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia, a particular significance. The Arch Duke has declared in Berlin that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had gotten to the end of concessions which it could make to its neighbor. The Emperor

and his advisers have, nevertheless, not refrained from councilling moderation, which William II, while bringing his guest to the train, comprised in his peculiar and familiar manner of expression, in the following expressionful words: "Above all, no foolishness." I can vouch for the truthfulness of this advice by the testimony of the ambassadors who told it to me, and which escaped the indiscretions of the newspapers. There is no doubt that the Emperor, the Chancellor and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs are passionate adherents of peace. Whatever may be the plans of von Kiderlen-Waechter, who has big ideas about winning the sympathies of the young Balkan powers for his country, one thing is quite certain, namely, he is firmly determined to avoid a European conflagration.

The relations between the German and English Governments are better than they have been for a long time, and, according to what the French Ambassador assures me, there is also a very favorable slackening of the tension between the cabinets of Berlin and France for the maintenance of peace going on. To bring Austria to the point of showing herself more conciliatory has been successful on the part of the Imperial Government, but it alone will not suffice to prevent a conflict. The stubborn resistance which Servia makes against a decrease of her demands must also be broken. At the end of last week a rumor was circulating among the Chancellories of Europe, that Monsieur Sazonow had given up the fight against the court party which wants to drive Russia into a war, notwithstanding, that the bottom of the Russian Empire is undermined by revolution and her military preparations are still insufficient. But within the last two days, especially since the Czar received the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in audience, a feeling of confidence has succeeded the disturbance of last week.

BEYENS.

No. 97.

Paris, February 14, 1913.

Baron Guillaume.

The new president of the republic is momentarily enjoying a popularity in France which was not known to any of his predecessors; only to speak of two of these, the election of Monsieur Loubet was received fairly unfriendly by public opinion, and that of Fallieres left every one perfectly cold.

Monsieur Poincare is daily the object of sympathy manifestations, etc., etc.

This popularity has various causes, his election had been cleverly managed; one shows him gratitude for the reason that he operated cleverly enough during his ministerial term, to place France in the foreground in the European concerts; several times he was fortunate in making deep impressions in his addresses. But first in line one must recognize, therein the manifestations of that old French Chauvinism, which had quite receded for many long years, but which has gained in strength since the events of Agadir. Monsieur Poincaré is a Lorrainer, and allows no opportunity to pass to remember it. He was the co-worker and instigator of the militaristic policy of Monsieur Millerand.

GUILLAUME.

No. 98.

Paris, February 19, 1913.

Baron Guillaume.

I saw just now the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who told me that the international situation had scarcely changed. The Bulgarian army is not making any noticeable progress and the conference of Ambassadors in London finds itself apparently in a kind of marasmus.

The Vienna Cabinet still remains in all questions which concern it, irreconceivable and Russia is energetically defending Servia and Montenegro. The German press is wondering about the military measures which the French Government intends to make as an answer to the army increase by Germany.

"The newspapers and, especially, the 'Temps' are wrong when they, in the discussion of the plans of the French Government, represent these as an answer to the measures which had been taken by the Germans. Many are only the result of studies made a long time ago.

The Minister does not regard the measures taken by Germany as a hostile act but rather as precautionary measures for the future. Germany fears of finding herself one of these days, contemporaneously involved in combat with Russia and France, and possibly also with England, whereas the support which Austria could give her, might be very much restricted by the fact that the double monarchy would have to face the group of Balkan States. The relations between the French Ambassy in Berlin and Wilhelm Strasse continue and are excellent.

GUILLAUME.

No. 99.

Paris, February 21, 1913.

Baron Guillaume.

The news of the intended appointment of Monsieur Delcassé to the Ambassadorship to St. Petersburg, fell yesterday afternoon like a bombshell. The papers brought the news at the same with the text of the message of the President of the Republic. Was this coming together intentional? As it appears: Yes, in any case it was well noted and exerted a depressing influence upon the Exchange.

The personality of Monsieur Delcassé is well known and very significant. He was the instigator of the Russian-French Treaty, and in a still higher degree of the French-English friendship. Is the choice of the new ambassador to St. Petersburg to be interpreted as a German hostile manifestation? I don't believe it, but, instead, I am of the opinion that Monsieur Poincaré, as a Lorrainer, rather liked to demonstrate his endeavors, of showing himself firm and to hold high the flag of his country from the very first day of his high office.

In these turbulent times, in which Europe finds herself, lies the danger which the presence of Monsieur Poincaré in the Elysee Palace offers. Have not the militaristic, and somewhat chauvinistic instincts of the French people been awakened under his ministerial activity? In this reversion of sentiment his hand was recognizable; it must be hoped that his political, practical and cool sense will guard him

against any exaggeration in this direction. The very considerable strengthening of the German armament at the moment of Poincaré's entrance in the Elysee, will augment the danger of the only too nationalistic orientation of the French politics.

GUILLAUME.

No. 100.

London, February 24, 1913.

Count Lalaing.

The great military plans of Germany, and, possibly still more, the very rapid and firm response by France, have moved the political circles and have agitated the phantasy of the public. Both governments are prepared to make considerable financial sacrifices, and are, apparently, supported by public opinion in both countries, where the socialists, solely and alone, are raising a dissenting voice.

The English press naturally desires to burden Germany with responsibility of the new tension, which arose through her plans and could give Europe occasion for new disturbances.

In the Foreign Office, I have found a more just and more reasonable conception prevalent. One sees in the strengthening of the German Army less of a provocation but rather a concession, that the military situation has been made worse by events and that, therefore, it will have to be improved. The Berlin Government has to confess that it can no longer count, as before, upon the support with all powers of its Austrian ally, since a new power has made its appearance in the southeast of Europe in the form of the Balkan Alliance, just in the flank of the double monarchy. Far removed, from being able to count upon the full support of the Viennese Government in case of need, Germany will very likely be compelled to lend it her help. In the case of a European War, she would have to face her enemies on two fronts, the Russian and the French and, perhaps, to have to weaken her own troops in order to help the Austrian Army. Under such conditions, one does not find it astounding that the German Empire feels the necessity of increasing the number of her army corps.

LALAING.

No. 101.

Paris, March 3, 1913.

Baron Guillaume.

The German Ambassador told me on Saturday: Since the last forty-eight hours the political situation has bettered itself; the lessening of the tension is general. One may hope for an early return to peace. But what is not improving is the attitude of public opinion in France and Germany in regard to the relations between the two countries. Among ourselves we are convinced that we have to fear an attack by the Republic on account of the reawakening of the Chauvinistic spirit; in France one expresses the same apprehensions from our side. The consequence of these misunderstandings is to ruin both of us. I do not known whereto we shall drift on this dangerous road. Can there no one be found with sufficient good will and esteem to bring the whole world back again to reason? Everything is the

more ridiculous, as both governments have shown the friendliest sentiments during the entire crisis through which we are passing and have mutually supported each in avoiding the origin of any conflicts.

Freiherr von Schoen is perfectly right. From my position here, I can scarcely gauge the public opinion of Germany, but I am observing daily how the public opinion in France is becoming more and more suspicious and chauvinistic.

One meets only people, who assure you that an early war with Germany is certain, nay unavoidable. The most sensible people contend that it is necessary to arm oneself to the very teeth to frighten the opponent and to prevent a war.

Yesterday evening I met Monsieur Pichon who repeated to me the same words: It is necessary to increase the armament still more to prevent the war.

GUILLAUME.

No. 102.

Berlin, March 18, 1913.

Baron Beyens.

The unpleasant conditions of the Balkan States for the consummation of peace are explicable by the certainty which they have, that it is impossible for the Great Powers to force them to their will. The wishes of the powers can only be materialized by means of pressure upon the Balkan States. Up to now the Unity has ceased as soon as it came to go to actual deeds. This is known in Safia, in Belgrade and in Athens, and this inactivity of the Great Powers, which appeared after the first victories of the allies, encouraged them to show themselves arrogant and irreconcilable.

They are also being encouraged, herein, by the double faced attitude of Russia. The representatives of the Balkan States in Berlin make today no more secret of the close connections which their governments are forming with the Cabinet of St. Petersburg. It only was informed of their treaty, and only after its approval, did they start the fight. The Russian diplomacy is holding the allies, so to speak, on a rope. They receive their instructions from it, and obtain from it their pass word. But the Russian diplomacy has wavered considerably since the beginning of the hostilities. In a communicative moment, the French Ambassador in Berlin did not deny to me, how difficult it was to count upon the highly able but inconsistent politicians, who are guiding the Empire associated with France, for they played a double game even with himself. Monsieur Cambon complained, especially of the influence, which Iswolsky had maintained because he wants to revenge himself personally on Austro-Hungary, and takes pains to spoil the game if it appears that she is winning it.

BEYENS.

No. 103.

Berlin, April 4, 1913.

Baron Beyens.

From the European viewpoint the incident of Scutari is, no doubt, the most serious one since the opening of hostilities in the Balkans. It

is readily understood that the King of Montenegro persistently resists against the demands of Austro-Hungary and against the pressure exerted by the Powers. In view of his military mishaps, his crown is at stake; the only chance, then, he has to keep it, is by means of an internal revolution, which will very likely be the possible result of the desperation in which his subjects will find themselves if he becomes in their eyes a victim of the Austro-Hungarian policy. Without the help of the Servians he cannot continue the siege of Scutari. But now the arrogance and contempt with which these receive the complaints of the Vienna Cabinet, can only be explained by the support which they believe to find in St. Petersburg. The Servian Charge D'Affairs said here recently, that his Government had not gone forward for six months without bothering itself about the Austrian threats if it had not been encouraged by the Russian Ambassador, Monsieur von Hartwig, a diplomat of the School of Iswolsky.

The Russian policy displays a hesitancy which renders the European situation particularly difficult. Monsieur Sazonov is at heart, in concord with his colleagues who are guiding the policy of the powers, but he feels that his influence with the Czar is being undermined by the Court party and the pan-Slavists. Hence the contradictions in his attitude.

There is no doubt, that one is tired of those counter moves in Paris, but one tolerates if even with maledictions, the consequences of the alliance, and permits oneself to be forced upon a road which possibly may lead to a general war.

In Berlin one is not particularly edified about the direction which the Vienna Cabinet has given to the Triple Alliance in the Balkan question, but one displays a better attitude and looks cold bloodedly into the face of the complications which might arise from it.

BEYENS.

No. 104

Paris, April 16, 1913.

Baron Guillaume.

There are not as yet any exact details about the incidents at Nancy (mistreatment of Germans by the French populace) and, especially, not about the one at the Casino—a resort of the third rank—where the quarrel began and where a performance under the title "The Ulan" had been played. That kind of show should not be permitted to be played.

The affair, which really has no significance, will doubtless be pushed aside, but it is, as the Minister told me, serious insofar as it proves how influenced the minds are on both sides.

Even with us, Monsieur Pichon continued, there dominates a Chauvinism which is further developing, and which, I regret and against which one will have to battle. In half of the Parisian theatres nationalistic and chauvinistic pieces are now being played. I do not go to see them, but it is not sufficient; one should have the means of preventing the production of such plays. It depends upon bringing the minds again into a more tranquil condition.

GUILLAUME.

No. 105

Paris, April 17, 1913.

Baron Guillaume.

One does not know as yet what the final results of the investigation in Nancy about the German-French incidents will be. The numerous correspondence which the newspapers are publishing are creating the impression that the facts have not sufficient significance to justify the raising of the shield by a part of the German press or the words of the Under-Secretary of State in the Berlin Parliament. But, doubtless, these facts will also prove and whereof I have had several times the honor to report to you that the public opinion in France is becoming more and more chauvinistic and heedless. One should take measures to stem this current which the government has truly encouraged since the incidents of Agadir and the formation of the Cabinet Poincare-Millerand-Delcassé.

GUILLAUME.

No. 106

Berlin, May 26, 1913.

Baron Beyens.

This report concerns only the marriage of the Princess Victoria Louisa with Prince Ernest August, Duke of Brunswick-Lueneburg and its political consequences. It is unimportant in the present European complications and therefore omitted.

No. 107

Paris, June 13, 1913.

Baron Guillaume.

The newspapers have announced that the Ministerial Council has concluded to ask the Chamber of Deputies to accord special sessions for the discussion of the Military Law, the acceptance of which, it is determined, to secure before the Parliament adjourns. It is now also positive that certain laws will be introduced into the French statutes which the country will, very likely, not be able to stand for very long. The burdens of the new law will be so heavy for the people, the expenses which it brings with itself will be enormous, that the country will soon protest against it, and France will then have to face the question: either to relinquish what she will not be able to stand or to go to war within the briefest of time. For those who have brought the people into this situation, it will be a heavy responsibility. One follows them in a sort of headlessness, of interesting but regrettable insanity. Upon the danger of being accused of high treason, it is forbidden to-day, only to doubt the necessity of a three years' service. The propaganda in favor of the law for a three years' service through which a return of chauvinism is to be brought about, has been excellently prepared and carried out; it began with promoting the election of Monsieur Poincaré to the presidency of the Republic; it is, to-day, continuing its work without troubling itself about the dangers which it evokes; the discomfort in the country is great.

GILLAUME.

No. 108

London, November 7, 1913.

Count Lalaing.

Sir Edward Grey made a speech in New Castle about the duties of a Minister of Foreign Affairs which should have four cardinal points in view:

1. All political changes or combinations which might endanger the external safety of the country should be avoided.

2. The territorial possessions of the country, which already were large enough, should not be increased, and it would be necessary to restrict oneself to guard England's possessions and to develop them.

3. The British Commerce, above all, should be promoted by the avoidance of a war.

4. The influence of the Nation should be utilized in promoting the humanitarian endeavors of the world.

Practically all of these requirements may be interpreted in the following manner:

1. The Minister stands for the maintenance of the Triple Entente.

2. He does not favor any policy of conquest which might provoke the disapproval of the great competitors of England.

3. He desires to promote the economic expansion of the country under exclusion of the care of international entanglements; that is, he wants to maintain as friendly relations with Germany as possible.

4. He does not relinquish the intention of using England's prestige and influence for the promotion of humanitarian endeavors toward other nations, probably above all, toward the weaker States.

This dangerous and stretchable formula should please the philanthropic party, so powerful in this country, and yet leave the door open for interventions which are often unjustified and provoke bitterness. What duplicity.

LALAING.

No. 109

London, Dec. 13, 1913.

Count Lalaing.

Recounts only the fall of the Cabinet of Barthou in Paris, and is omitted as not bearing on the issue.

No. 110

Paris, Jan. 16, 1914.

Baron Guillaume.

It seems to me that we should have more concern in seeing the policy of Monsieur Cailloux—the Radicals and radical Socialists—successful. I have already had the honor of reporting to you that it had been Poincaré, Delcassé, Millerand and their friends who had invented and followed the nationalistic, militaristic and chauvinistic policy, the re-establishment of which we have confirmed. It represents a peril for Europe—and for Belgium. Therein I see the greatest danger, which menaces to-day the peace of Europe, not as if I was justified in the assumption that the French Government intended pur-

posely to disturb the peace—I rather believe the contrary—but because the attitude of the Cabinet of Barthou has, in my opinion, evoked an increase of militaristic tendencies in Germany.

The war lust of Turkey, and the law for the three years' service, appear to me to form the only dangers which menace the peace of Europe. I believe I am able to demonstrate the dangers which are embodied in the present army legislation of the Republic. France, which is enfeebled by the falling off of the birth rate, will not be able to carry for long the system of the law of three years' service. The effort is too great, not only from the financial, but also the personal viewpoint. Such an effort France will not be able to support, and what will she do to extricate herself from the difficult situation in which she will find herself?

Monsieur Cailloux, who is really the Premier, is leaning toward an rapproachment to Germany, as is well known. He knows his country excellently and realizes that—with the exception of the political leaders, a handful of chauvinists and a few people who do not wish to confess their thoughts and tendencies—the majority of the Frenchmen, peasants, merchants, industrials—only reluctantly bear the excessive expenditures and personal burdens which are imposed upon them.

GUILLAUME.

No. 111

Berlin, Feb. 20, 1914.

Baron Beyens.

The German-French understanding in regard to Asia Minor, which was concluded quite recently after difficult transactions, and, thanks to the personal intervention of the Chancellor in Berlin, secures to France a very considerable sphere of activity and influence in Syria.

I asked the French Ambassador whether the agreement in Asia Minor, which had been so earnestly desired by the Emperor, as I had the honor to report to you, would, in his opinion, contribute in bettering the German-French relations. "The official relations perhaps to a certain extent," answered Monsieur Cambon, "but I do not believe that this understanding will have any influence upon the feelings of the great public of both sides of the Voges (?). The language of the French press toward the Germans will, unfortunately, not experience any change thereby. Since the Dreyfous affair, we have in France also a militaristic and nationalistic party which does not, at any price, desire a better understanding with Germany and which strengthens a large part of the press in its aggressive tone. The government would have to reckon with the press and the party, whose mouth-piece it is, in case a serious incident should occur again between the two nations. Incontestably the majority of the Germans and Frenchmen desire to live in peace, but in both countries there is a powerful minority which dreams only of battles and fights for conquests and revenge. Therein lies the danger, alongside of which one must live as alongside a powder keg, whose explosion may be effected by some imprudence or other.

BEYENS.

No. 112

Paris, March 10, 1914.

Baron Guillaume.

Baron Guillaume at first speaks of the tour of inspection which the President of the Republic is required to make of the various departments of France. He further relates how much the President is liked in all parts of the country and how he receives calls which are flattering to him and which are useful to his policies. Baron Guillaume also states that the fall of Barthou's Cabinet had been painful to the President, because it had been clear to him, that his own person had been meant by it. The circumstances which forced him to place the power into the hands of Monsieur Cailloux have greatly displeased him. The personality of the Minister of Finance, whose merits he knows as well as his weaknesses, is highly antipathetical to him. He sees therein a failure in the militaristic and nationalistic policy, which he has systematically followed since the day on which he was placed as Premier at the head of the Government.

Together with Monsieur Delcassé, Millerand and a few others, he has, unceasingly, preached of the political and military re-establishment of France in conjunction with the creation of closer and more intimate relations with Russia. As President of Ministry he went to St. Petersburg, and in a few months he will return there as President of the Republic. He recently sent Monsieur Delcassé there with the mission of emphasizing with all means at command the benefits of a French-Russian Alliance and to influence the great Empire for the enlargement of its military preparations.

GUILLAUME.

No. 113

Berlin, April 24, 1914.

Baron Beyens.

The press as well as the political circles of Berlin have necessarily been occupied with the visit of the English Sovereign Pair to Paris, and it needed nothing less than the latest events in Mexico to draw their attention away from this spectacle. One found here . . . how crude the efforts of certain French publicists had been in their aim to influence the British Government to transform the "Entente Cordiale" into a real alliance; both the liberal as well as the conservative Berlin journalists recorded their discomfiture with undisguised joy.

Monsieur Cambon sees again the hand of Iswolsky in this useless campaign of the Russian and French newspapers. Iswolsky is again in great favor in St. Petersburg, as is apparent from the high distinction he received with the ribbon of the Alexandernewski Order, but in Paris he does not possess the ear of the Radical Cabinet. The French Ambassador in Berlin, therefore, hopes that the intriguing diplomat will soon represent the Czar in London.

For the most interesting question, which arises on account of the visit of the English Sovereigns, is to know whether the British Government would be just as much disposed, as three years ago, to stand by France in case of a conflict with Germany. We had the

proof for it that the collaboration of the English Army and the dispatch of an expeditionary corps to the Continent had been kept in view by the Military authorities of both countries. Will it be today just the same and must we still continue to fear that English soldiers will march into Belgium in order to assist us in the defense of our neutrality by thus compromising it from the start?

If the question is only weighed from the German viewpoint, which is the only one that I could entertain, a negative answer is not doubtful. To any observer living in Berlin it has the appearance as if the vorations within the "Entente Cordiale" had been somewhat slackened, as if the point of the defensive weapon was no longer exclusively aimed at Germany, as it had been in the time of King Edward, and, as if the "Triple Entente" was rather a concert than a treaty of powers, which act together in certain well defined questions, in the pursuit of common interests. But this viewpoint may be wrong, or may be influenced by political writings which originate from German pens. It would be interesting for me to know what my colleagues in London and Paris think of the character which the "Entente Cordiale" has assumed.

BEYENS.

No. 114

Paris, April 25, 1914.

Baron Guillaume.

Baron Guillaume merely remarks on the visit of the King and Queen of England to Paris and that this visit had been very successful, because everything had been auspicious in bringing about the warmest manifestations of sympathy. "These manifestations, so Baron Guillaume interprets, were devoted, especially, to the principles of the "Entente Cordiale" and found particular nourishment in the Nationalism, not to say Chauvinism, which the leaders of the nation had explained so as to enforce the principle of the crushing law about the three years' military service with all of its personal, economic and financial consequences.

The circumstances which Emperor Nicholas choose this moment to confer a high distinction upon the Russian Ambassador in Paris under significant comments, completes the international character of the Parisian manifestations in honor of King George.

GUILLAUME.

No. 115

Paris, May 8, 1914.

Baron Guillaume.

Yesterday I had an opportunity of speaking with a Parisian who knows the international situation the best; he told me: "The visit of the King and Queen of England has succeeded completely, the sun participated in the celebration, and the French love to inaugurate demonstrations and to shout: 'Long live the King.' They prepared, therefore, a really hearty welcome for their guests, but I doubt that these demonstrations will change the policies of the two

countries in the least. The toast of King George was palpably less hearty than that of Monsieur Poincaré."

Of what character are the obligations which bind the two states together; have they concluded a military combination? I don't know, but I do not forget that thinking and sober heads doubt that France would find assistance from the Englishmen on the day of a European conflagration. There are even people who do not believe in serious support by England at sea. Furthermore, England does not cease coquetting with Germany. I have not been able to find out what has become of the German-English transactions about Angola and Mosambique.

Incontestably, the French nation has become more chauvinistic and self-conscious in these last few months. The same understanding and professional people, who two years ago expressed the most vital apprehensions upon the mere mentioning of possible difficulties between France and Germany, are singing to-day quite a different tune; they claim to be sure of victory, and make much to do of the really existing progress which the French Army has made, and contend that they will be able to hold the German Army in check long enough to give Russia time for mobilization, to concentrate her troops and then to fall upon her western neighbor. I do not believe that either of the two countries earnestly desire to risk the horrible game of war, but with the character of the French people, it is always to be feared that any incident under unfortunate representation may lead the people or, rather, the most nervous and lowest elements of the populace, into a situation which would make a war unavoidable. An experienced and highly placed diplomat said recently: "If right now there was to occur suddenly some serious incident between France and Germany, the statesmen of both countries would have to find an amicable solution within the next three days or there will be war.

The most dangerous moment in the immediate situation is the return in France to the law of the three years' service. It was frivolously railroaded through, but the country is not able to bear it. Within two years it will have to be abolished or war will have to be made."

GUILLAUME.

No. 116

Paris, June 9, 1914.

Baron Guillaume.

The press campaign in favor of the principle of the three years' service has been, during the past few days, extraordinarily vehement; all methods have been employed to influence public opinion and even the attempt to compromise the personality of General Joffre had been made. We have also seen the French Ambassador in St. Petersburg, contrary to all precedents, take an initiative, which is an exceedingly dangerous one for the future of France.

Is it true that the Cabinet in St. Petersburg has driven the country into the acceptance of the law for the three years' service, and is, to-day, demanding with all its force, its maintenance?

I have not succeeded in being enlightened on this ticklish point, but it would be so much more serious in significance, as the men, who guide the destiny of the Czar's Empire, must know, that the imposed effort is too great for the French people and that it cannot last very long. Is the attitude of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg perhaps based upon the conviction, that events are near enough to utilize the instruments which it desires to place in the hands of its allies?

GUILLAUME.

No. 117

London, June 11, 1914.

Count Lalaing.

On the 8th of this month I had the honor of reporting to you the unrest which the recent ministerial crisis in France has produced here. The formation of the Cabinet Ribot has, therefore, been received with great satisfaction, for one is of the opinion that the Republic will only be placed in position to satisfy the obligations which bind her to her Russian ally or her English friend by the application of the law of the three years' service. The French patriotism, which one does not want to question, has now the word; party entanglements must recede behind the higher interests of the nation.

LALAING.

No. 118

Berlin, June 12, 1914.

Baron Beyens.

In view of the spectacle which France is offering, it appears to-day, as if the Cabinet Barthou had expected too much from the strength and feeling of the country when it demanded the re-establishment of the three years' service, and as if the Germans were right to believe this. The French people did not display on this occasion the patriotic sacrifice of which it had given proof on other occasions. That is undoubtedly due to the spread of socialistic ideas among the lower strata of the nation. However it may be, the question must arise whether the Cabinet and the President of the Republic have not acted hastily, whether they had not been badly informed in regard to the real intentions of the Imperial Government when it submitted last year the law providing for an army increase, and whether they did right in responding, move by move, with the law of the three years' service, instead of assuring themselves that the strengthening of the German effective signified actually a weapon pointed at France. I have come to the conclusion that, as von Bethmann-Holweg announced from the speakers' platform in the Reichstag, the danger of a Balkan alliance, which later on could cripple a large part of the Austrian strength, had been the main reason for the German law of 1913. A few weeks after the promulgation of that law, the Balkan Alliance had ceased to exist, but the Imperial Government found itself in a new and unsuspected danger: the introduction of a law for the increase of the active strength of the French Army, to which a vehement campaign of speeches and newspaper articles against Germany had attached itself. The result of this excitement

which the Frenchmen displayed was a greater tension in the relation to the neighboring Empire and the birth of the idea that the war would be inevitable in the near future because France desired it earnestly and was feverishly arming herself to be prepared for it.

Paris is accusing the Imperial Government of the same intentions; several of the members of the latter have really used, now and then, unfortunate expressions as, for instance, the Minister of War, with his words, "lightning-like offensive and unsuspected attack," to secure the victory of the Germany Army. Perhaps even to-day it is only a horrible mutual mistake of both nations. The majority of the French people certainly do not want war, and Germany does not want this war. In a few years there will be no balance of power possible between her and her neighbor. Germany only needs patience, only needs to increase in peace lastingly her economic and financial power, only needs to await the effects of the surplus of her birth rate, to reign, without contradiction and without combat, over the whole of Central Europe.

Barthou and Poincaré would, therefore, have perhaps done better to examine the question more cold-bloodedly, whether there would not have been better means to guard the peace between France and Germany than this race of armament and increase of active strength, the burdens of which the former is less able to carry for any length of time than the latter.

Another point which might be brought against the adherents of the three years' service in France is the constant intervention of Russia into the debate over this internal question—Russia, whose political aims remain obscure, which utilizes the double alliance for her exclusive benefit and which also increased her armament in an alarming manner, without being menaced by Germany!

As far as it concerns us, we need not be partisan—as, unfortunately, our French press is—for or against the maintenance of the three years' service by our neighbors. But we may put the following question before us: Would not the victory of the Radical party over the moderate Republicans, which are surrounding the President of the Republic, and the subsequent sacrifice of the military law of the Cabinet Barthou, be exceedingly favorable events for us? For they would contribute more than anything else, not only to keep away the dangers of a war from our frontier, the consequences of which we would have to fear, no matter what the outcome may be, but also to create again a secure situation in the west of Europe.

BEYENS.

No. 119

Berlin, July 2, 1914.

Baron Beyens.

The news that the Austrian Ambassador in Belgrade had been instructed to demand of the Servian Government an investigation of the anarchistic machinations to which the Arch Duke, Francis Ferdinand, and the Duchess of Hohenberg had fallen victims, and to permit the Austro-Hungarian police agents to participate in the investigations, has caused a certain unrest in the diplomatic circles of Berlin.

The fact that this decision of directing this demand to the Cabinet of Belgrade had been formulated upon a conference between the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Berchtold, the Chief of the General Staff, Konrad von Hoetzendorff and the Minister of War, Krobatin, furnishes still more food for the comments, which the news had evoked. One must certainly draw into consideration the incense which the crime, the confessions of the murderers about the origin of their bombs, which had been sent from Belgrade, as well as the inconsiderate language of some of the papers of that capital, had produced in Vienna; they endeavored to justify the crime by representing it as a merited punishment for the suppression which the Servian elements and the Servian National feeling had to suffer in Bosnia. The Cabinet Paschitch, which closed its eyes so as not to see the source of the anarchistic propaganda in Belgrade, must not be surprised if an energetic proceeding against the culprits is demanded of it, instead of treating them still further with blind patience. But, nevertheless, the demand exceeds the usual principles of right. If a state consents upon the request of a foreign government to proceed against criminals in its own territory, it entrusts its own employees with the investigations. Will Servia consent to the collaboration of the Austro-Hungarian Police officials? If she rejects it as an infringement of her sovereign rights, will then arise a conflict which, in consideration of the justifiable anger of the governments in Vienna and Budapest and in consideration of the Anti-Servian manifestations in a few cities of the Monarchy, may lead to hostilities.

In Berlin it is said that Servia would let it come that far only if she felt herself supported by Russia, but the Czar's Government would not sustain her, for she herself would have to share the abhorrence and the fear which the crime of the regicides from Sarajerro had evoked.

BEYENS.

Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process.
Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide
Treatment Date: SEP 2012
Preservation Technologies
A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION
111 Thomson Park Drive
Cranberry Township, PA 16066
(724) 779-2111

For extra copies write to
V. J. BLOCK
Room 221
405 Lexington Avenue
New York City

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
0 018 499 954 7

TWO INTERESTING STATEMENTS

No. 1—Statement of Judge Anderson:

Boston, January 12, 1920.—Judge George W. Anderson, of the United States District Court, told the Harvard Liberal Club tonight that, as United States District Attorney, he was charged with a large responsibility as to protecting the community from pro-German plots. He asserted as to his best judgment that more than ninety-nine per cent of the pro-German plots never existed.

No. 2—President Wilson on September 5, 1919, speaking in St. Louis, stated as follows:

"Why, my fellow citizens, is there any man here, or any woman, let me say, is there any child here, who does not know that the seed of war in the modern world is industrial and commercial rivalry? The reason why the war we have just finished took place was that Germany was afraid that her commercial rivals were going to get the better of her, and the reason why some nations went into the war against Germany was that they thought Germany would get the commercial advantage of them. The seed of the deep-seated hatred was hot, commercial and successful rivalry. . . . This war, in its inception, was a commercial and industrial war. It was not a political war."

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
0 018 499 954 7

Hollinger Corp.
pH 8.5